Sittenthaler Sandra, Jonas Eva, Traut-Mattausch Eva
University of Salzburg, Austria
University of Salzburg, Austria.
Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2016 Apr;42(4):458-70. doi: 10.1177/0146167216634055.
Research shows that people experience a motivational state of agitation known as reactance when they perceive restrictions to their freedoms. However, research has yet to show whether people experience reactance if they merely observe the restriction of another person's freedom. In Study 1, we activated realistic vicarious reactance in the laboratory. In Study 2, we compared people's responses with their own and others' restrictions and found the same levels of experienced reactance and behavioral intentions as well as aggressive tendencies. We did, however, find differences in physiological arousal: Physiological arousal increased quickly after participants imagined their own freedom being restricted, but arousal in response to imagining a friend's freedom being threatened was weaker and delayed. In line with the physiological data, Study 3's results showed that self-restrictions aroused more emotional thoughts than vicarious restrictions, which induced more cognitive responses. Furthermore, in Study 4a, a cognitive task affected only the cognitive process behind vicarious reactance. In contrast, in Study 4b, an emotional task affected self-reactance but not vicarious reactance. We propose a process model explaining the emotional and cognitive processes of self- and vicarious reactance.
研究表明，当人们察觉到自己的自由受到限制时，会经历一种被称为反抗的动机激发状态。然而，研究尚未表明，如果人们只是观察到他人的自由受到限制，是否会经历反抗。在研究1中，我们在实验室中激活了现实的替代性反抗。在研究2中，我们比较了人们对自身和他人受到限制的反应，发现他们在经历的反抗程度、行为意图以及攻击倾向方面处于相同水平。不过，我们确实发现了生理唤醒方面的差异：参与者想象自己的自由受到限制后，生理唤醒迅速增加，但想象朋友的自由受到威胁时的唤醒则较弱且延迟。与生理数据一致，研究3的结果表明，自我限制比替代性限制引发了更多的情感思维，而替代性限制则引发了更多的认知反应。此外，在研究4a中，一项认知任务仅影响替代性反抗背后的认知过程。相比之下，在研究4b中，一项情感任务影响了自我反抗，但未影响替代性反抗。我们提出了一个过程模型，用以解释自我反抗和替代性反抗的情感与认知过程。
