Solberg Carl Tollef, Gamlund Espen
Department of Global Public Health and Primary Care, University of Bergen, PB. 7804, 5018, Bergen, Norway.
Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, PB. 7805, 5020, Bergen, Norway.
BMC Med Ethics. 2016 Apr 14;17:21. doi: 10.1186/s12910-016-0104-6.
The state of the world is one with scarce medical resources where longevity is not equally distributed. Given such facts, setting priorities in health entails making difficult yet unavoidable decisions about which lives to save. The business of saving lives works on the assumption that longevity is valuable and that an early death is worse than a late death. There is a vast literature on health priorities and badness of death, separately. Surprisingly, there has been little cross-fertilisation between the academic fields of priority setting and badness of death. Our aim is to connect philosophical discussions on the badness of death to contemporary debates in health priorities.
Two questions regarding death are especially relevant to health priorities. The first question is why death is bad. Death is clearly bad for others, such as family, friends and society. Many philosophers also argue that death can be bad for those who die. This distinction is important for health priorities, because it concerns our fundamental reasons for saving lives. The second question is, 'When is the worst time to die?' A premature death is commonly considered worse than a late death. Thus, the number of good life years lost seems to matter to the badness of death. Concerning young individuals, some think the death of infants is worse than the death of adolescents, while others have contrary intuitions. Our claim is that to prioritise between age groups, we must consider the question of when it is worst to die.
Deprivationism provides a more plausible approach to health priorities than Epicureanism. If Deprivationism is accepted, we will have a firmer basis for claiming that individuals, in addition to having a health loss caused by morbidity, will have a loss of good life years due to mortality. Additionally, Deprivationism highlights the importance of age and values for health priorities. Regarding age, both variants of Deprivationism imply that stillbirths are included in the Global Burden of Disease. Finally, we suggest that the Time-Relative Interest Account may serve as an alternative to the discounting and age weighting previously applied in the Global Burden of Disease.
当今世界医疗资源稀缺,长寿并非平均分配。鉴于这些事实,确定卫生保健的优先事项需要做出艰难但不可避免的决定,即决定拯救哪些生命。拯救生命的工作基于这样的假设,即长寿是有价值的,早逝比晚逝更糟糕。关于卫生保健优先事项和死亡之恶,分别有大量的文献。令人惊讶的是,在确定优先事项和死亡之恶这两个学术领域之间几乎没有相互影响。我们的目标是将关于死亡之恶的哲学讨论与卫生保健优先事项的当代辩论联系起来。
关于死亡的两个问题与卫生保健优先事项特别相关。第一个问题是死亡为何是坏事。死亡显然对他人有害,比如家人、朋友和社会。许多哲学家也认为死亡对死者本人也可能是坏事。这种区分对卫生保健优先事项很重要,因为它涉及我们拯救生命的根本原因。第二个问题是,“何时是最糟糕的死亡时间?”早逝通常被认为比晚逝更糟糕。因此,失去的美好生命年数似乎对死亡之恶很重要。对于年轻人,一些人认为婴儿死亡比青少年死亡更糟糕,而另一些人则有相反的直觉。我们的主张是,要在不同年龄组之间确定优先顺序,我们必须考虑何时是最糟糕的死亡时间这个问题。
与伊壁鸠鲁主义相比,剥夺主义为卫生保健优先事项提供了一种更合理的方法。如果接受剥夺主义,我们将有更坚实的基础声称,个人除了因发病导致健康损失外,还会因死亡而失去美好生命年数。此外,剥夺主义突出了年龄和价值观对卫生保健优先事项的重要性。关于年龄,剥夺主义的两种变体都意味着死产应纳入全球疾病负担。最后,我们建议时间相关利益账户可以作为全球疾病负担中先前应用的贴现和年龄加权的替代方法。