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完整生命为何如此重要?对稀缺资源分配中修正后的最年轻优先原则的批判。

What is so important about completing lives? A critique of the modified youngest first principle of scarce resource allocation.

作者信息

Gamlund Espen

机构信息

Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, PB 7805, 5020, Bergen, Norway.

出版信息

Theor Med Bioeth. 2016 Apr;37(2):113-28. doi: 10.1007/s11017-016-9358-8.

Abstract

Ruth Tallman has recently offered a defense of the modified youngest first principle of scarce resource allocation [1]. According to Tallman, this principle calls for prioritizing adolescents and young adults between 15-40 years of age. In this article, I argue that Tallman's defense of the modified youngest first principle is vulnerable to important objections, and that it is thus unsuitable as a basis for allocating resources. Moreover, Tallman makes claims about the badness of death for individuals at different ages, but she lacks an account of the loss involved in dying to support her claims. To fill this gap in Tallman's account, I propose a view on the badness of death that I call 'Deprivationism'. I argue that this view explains why death is bad for those who die, and that it has some advantages over Tallman's complete lives view in the context of scarce resource allocation. Finally, I consider some objections to the relevance of Deprivationism to resource allocation, and offer my responses.

摘要

露丝·塔尔曼最近为稀缺资源分配的修正版最年轻优先原则进行了辩护[1]。根据塔尔曼的说法,这一原则要求优先考虑15至40岁的青少年和年轻人。在本文中,我认为塔尔曼对修正版最年轻优先原则的辩护容易受到重要的反驳,因此它不适宜作为资源分配的依据。此外,塔尔曼对不同年龄段个体死亡的坏处提出了主张,但她缺乏对死亡所涉及损失的阐述来支持她的主张。为了填补塔尔曼论述中的这一空白,我提出了一种关于死亡坏处的观点,我称之为“剥夺主义”。我认为这种观点解释了死亡对逝者为何是坏事,并且在稀缺资源分配的背景下,它比塔尔曼的完整生命观具有一些优势。最后,我考虑了一些对剥夺主义与资源分配相关性的反驳,并给出了我的回应。

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