Salice Alessandro, Montes Sánchez Alba
Department of Philosophy, University College Cork Cork, Ireland.
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen Copenhagen, Denmark.
Front Psychol. 2016 Apr 26;7:557. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00557. eCollection 2016.
Self-conscious emotions such as shame and pride are emotions that typically focus on the self of the person who feels them. In other words, the intentional object of these emotions is assumed to be the subject that experiences them. Many reasons speak in its favor and yet this account seems to leave a question open: how to cash out those cases in which one genuinely feels ashamed or proud of what someone else does? This paper contends that such cases do not necessarily challenge the idea that shame and pride are about the emoting subject. Rather, we claim that some of the most paradigmatic scenarios of shame and pride induced by others can be accommodated by taking seriously the consideration that, in such cases, the subject "group-identifies" with the other. This is the idea that, in feeling these forms of shame or pride, the subject is conceiving of herself as a member of the same group as the subject acting shamefully or in an admirable way. In other words, these peculiar emotive responses are elicited in the subject insofar as, and to the extent that, she is (or sees herself as being) a member of a group - the group to which those who act shamefully or admirably also belong. By looking into the way in which the notion of group identification can allow for an account of hetero-induced shame and pride, this paper attempts to achieve a sort of mutual enlightenment that brings to light not only an important and generally neglected form of self-conscious emotions, but also relevant features of group identification. In particular, it generates evidence for the idea that group identification is a psychological process that the subject does not have to carry out intentionally in the sense that it is not necessarily triggered by the subject's conative states like desires or intentions.
诸如羞耻和自豪等自我意识情绪是通常聚焦于感受这些情绪的人的自我的情绪。换句话说,这些情绪的意向对象被假定为体验它们的主体。有许多理由支持这一观点,但这种解释似乎仍留下一个问题:如何解释那些人们真正为别人的行为感到羞耻或自豪的情况呢?本文认为,这些情况不一定会挑战羞耻和自豪是关于情绪主体这一观点。相反,我们认为,由他人引发的一些最典型的羞耻和自豪场景可以通过认真考虑这样一种情况来加以解释,即在这些情况下,主体与他人进行“群体认同”。也就是说,在感受这些形式的羞耻或自豪时,主体将自己视为与做出可耻行为或令人钦佩行为的主体属于同一群体的成员。换句话说,只要主体是(或认为自己是)一个群体的成员——那些做出可耻行为或令人钦佩行为的人也属于的那个群体,主体就会产生这些特殊的情感反应。通过研究群体认同概念如何能够解释由他人引发的羞耻和自豪,本文试图实现一种相互启发,这不仅揭示了一种重要且普遍被忽视的自我意识情绪形式,还揭示了群体认同的相关特征。特别是,它为群体认同是一种心理过程这一观点提供了证据,即主体不一定必须有意地进行这种心理过程,因为它不一定由主体的诸如欲望或意图等意动状态触发。