Aldridge Judith, Décary-Hétu David
School of Law, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK.
School of Criminology, University of Montreal, Montreal H3 C 3J7, Canada; International Centre for Comparative Criminology (ICCC), Canada.
Int J Drug Policy. 2016 Sep;35:7-15. doi: 10.1016/j.drugpo.2016.04.020. Epub 2016 May 6.
In spite of globalizing processes 'offline' retail drug markets remain localized and - in recent decades - typically 'closed', in which dealers sell primarily to known customers. We characterize drug cryptomarkets as 'anonymous open' marketplaces that allow the diffusion of drugs across locales. Where cryptomarket customers make stock-sourcing purchases for offline distribution, the cryptomarket may indirectly serve drug users who are not themselves cryptomarket customers, thereby increasing the drug diffusing capacity of these marketplaces. Our research aimed to identify wholesale activity on the first major cryptomarket, Silk Road 1.
Data were collected 13-15 September 2013. A bespoke web crawler downloaded content from the first major drug cryptomarket, Silk Road 1. This generated data on 1031 vendors and 10,927 drug listings. We estimated monthly revenues to ascertain the relative importance of wholesale priced listings.
Wholesale-level revenue generation (sales for listings priced over USD $1000.00) accounted for about a quarter of the revenue generation on SR1 overall. Ecstasy-type drugs dominated wholesale activity on this marketplace, but we also identified substantial wholesale transactions for benzodiazepines and prescription stimulants. Less important, but still generating wholesale revenue, were cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin. Although vendors on the marketplace were located in 41 countries, wholesale activity was confined to only a quarter of these, with China, the Netherlands, Canada and Belgium prominent.
The cryptomarket may function in part as a virtual broker, linking wholesalers with offline retail-level distributors. For drugs like ecstasy, these marketplaces may link vendors in producer countries directly with retail level suppliers. Wholesale activity on cryptomarkets may serve to increase the diffusion of new drugs - and wider range of drugs - in offline drug markets, thereby indirectly serving drug users who are not cryptomarket customers themselves. Cryptomarkets provide researchers and policy makers with a rich source of drug monitoring information. Further research should ascertain whether their virtual location may reduce the violence associated with middle market drug activity. We caution that conflict may instead manifest in other ways, including threats, fraud, and blackmail.
尽管存在全球化进程,但“线下”零售药品市场仍具有局限性,并且在近几十年里通常是“封闭的”,即经销商主要向熟客销售药品。我们将药品隐秘市场描述为“匿名开放”的市场,这类市场允许药品在不同地区扩散。当隐秘市场的客户为线下分销进行备货采购时,隐秘市场可能会间接服务于那些本身并非隐秘市场客户的吸毒者,从而提高这些市场的药品扩散能力。我们的研究旨在识别首个主要隐秘市场“丝绸之路1号”上的批发活动。
于2013年9月13日至15日收集数据。一个定制的网络爬虫程序从首个主要药品隐秘市场“丝绸之路1号”下载内容。这生成了有关1031个供应商和10927条药品 listing 的数据。我们估算了月收入,以确定批发价 listing 的相对重要性。
批发层面的创收(价格超过1000.00美元的 listing 的销售额)约占“丝绸之路1号”整体创收的四分之一。摇头丸类药物在该市场的批发活动中占主导地位,但我们也发现了苯二氮䓬类药物和处方兴奋剂的大量批发交易。可卡因、甲基苯丙胺和海洛因虽不太重要,但仍产生批发收入。尽管该市场上的供应商分布在41个国家,但批发活动仅局限于其中四分之一的国家,中国、荷兰、加拿大和比利时较为突出。
隐秘市场可能在一定程度上起到虚拟经纪人的作用,将批发商与线下零售层面的经销商联系起来。对于摇头丸这类毒品,这些市场可能会将生产国的供应商直接与零售层面的供应商联系起来。隐秘市场上的批发活动可能有助于增加新药以及更广泛种类毒品在离线药品市场的扩散,从而间接服务于那些本身并非隐秘市场客户的吸毒者。隐秘市场为研究人员和政策制定者提供了丰富的药品监测信息来源。进一步的研究应确定其虚拟位置是否可能减少与中间市场毒品活动相关的暴力行为。我们提醒,冲突可能会以其他方式表现出来,包括威胁、欺诈和敲诈勒索。