Aldridge Judith, Askew Rebecca
School of Law, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK.
Department of Sociology, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester M15 6LL, UK.
Int J Drug Policy. 2017 Mar;41:101-109. doi: 10.1016/j.drugpo.2016.10.010. Epub 2017 Jan 11.
Cryptomarkets represent an important drug market innovation by bringing buyers and sellers of illegal drugs together in a 'hidden' yet public online marketplace. We ask: How do cryptomarket drug sellers and buyers perceive the risks of detection and arrest, and attempt to limit them?
We analyse selected texts produced by vendors operating on the first major drug cryptomarket, Silk Road (N=600) alongside data extracted from the marketplace discussion forum that include buyer perspectives. We apply Fader's (2016) framework for understanding how drug dealers operating 'offline' attempt to reduce the risk of detection and arrest: visibility reduction, charge reduction and risk distribution.
We characterize drug transactions on cryptomarkets as 'stretched' across time, virtual and physical space, and handlers, changing the location and nature of risks faced by cryptomarket users. The key locations of risk of detection and arrest by law enforcement were found in 'offline' activities of cryptomarket vendors (packaging and delivery drop-offs) and buyers (receiving deliveries). Strategies in response involved either creating or disrupting routine activities in line with a non-offending identity. Use of encrypted communication was seen as 'good practice' but often not employed. 'Drop shipping' allowed some Silk Road vendors to sell illegal drugs without the necessity of handling them.
Silk Road participants neither viewed themselves as immune to, nor passively accepting of, the risk of detection and arrest. Rational choice theorists have viewed offending decisions as constrained by limited access to relevant information. Cryptomarkets as 'illicit capital' sharing communities provide expanded and low-cost access to information enabling drug market participants to make more accurate assessments of the risk of apprehension. The abundance of drug market intelligence available to those on both sides of the law may function to speed up innovation in illegal drug markets, as well as necessitate and facilitate the development of law enforcement responses.
加密市场通过在一个“隐藏”但公开的在线市场中将非法药物的买卖双方聚集在一起，代表了一种重要的毒品市场创新。我们提出疑问：加密市场的毒品卖家和买家如何看待被发现和逮捕的风险，并试图加以限制？
我们分析了在第一个主要毒品加密市场“丝绸之路”上运营的供应商所产生的选定文本（N = 600），以及从市场讨论论坛中提取的数据，其中包括买家的观点。我们应用法德（2016年）的框架来理解“线下”运营的毒贩如何试图降低被发现和逮捕的风险：降低可见度、减少指控和风险分配。
我们将加密市场上的毒品交易描述为在时间、虚拟和物理空间以及经手人之间“延伸”，改变了加密市场用户所面临风险的位置和性质。执法部门发现被发现和逮捕风险的关键地点存在于加密市场供应商的“线下”活动（包装和交货点）以及买家（接收货物）中。应对策略包括根据无犯罪身份创建或扰乱日常活动。使用加密通信被视为“良好做法”，但往往未被采用。“代发货”使一些“丝绸之路”供应商无需经手非法药物就能进行销售。
“丝绸之路”的参与者既不认为自己对被发现和逮捕的风险具有免疫力，也不是被动接受这种风险。理性选择理论学家认为犯罪决策受到获取相关信息的限制。作为“非法资本”共享社区的加密市场提供了广泛且低成本的信息获取途径，使毒品市场参与者能够更准确地评估被捕风险。法律双方人员都可获取的丰富毒品市场情报可能会加速非法毒品市场的创新，同时也促使并便利了执法应对措施的发展。
