Lee Keon-Hyung, Lim Seunghoo, Park Jungwon
Askew School of Public Administration and Policy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, 32306, USA.
Public Management and Policy Analysis Program, International University of Japan, Minami Uonuma-shi, Niigata, 949-7277, Japan.
Int J Equity Health. 2016 Jun 4;15:85. doi: 10.1186/s12939-016-0375-z.
This research evaluates the effect of hospital competition on inward and outward patient transfers for different types of payers including the uninsured. Although it is a less spotlighted issue, an equally important topic is the likelihood of inter-hospital patient transfers of the insured and the uninsured. This study attempts to fill a gap in the research about the relationship between hospital competition and patient transfers.
By developing the payer-specific level of hospital competition, this research evaluates the effect of hospital competition on inward and outward patient sharing (or patient transfers) for different types of payers including the uninsured. For patient transfers, instead of focusing on whether a patient is transferred from one hospital to another hospital at the patient level, we measure the numbers of patient transfers between hospitals (both inward and outward) at the hospital level. These dependent variables-the numbers of outward and inward patient transfers by the principal payers-are count variables, and we employ either a Poisson regression model or a negative binomial regression model.
Controlling for hospital characteristics, when the uninsured Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) increased by 0.01, the uninsured were 593 % more likely to be transferred to another hospital. When a hospital dominates its market, it tends to expel uninsured patients to other hospitals.
If patient transfers are medically unnecessary and primarily due to financial incentives, health administrators and policymakers should minimize such events. Since the uninsured who are admitted to a hospital that dominates its hospital market are likely to be much more vulnerable in their access to health care services, the state government of Florida needs to move toward increased health insurance coverage for eligible Floridians.
本研究评估了医院竞争对包括未参保者在内的不同类型支付方患者转入和转出的影响。尽管这是一个较少受到关注的问题,但一个同样重要的话题是参保者和未参保者在医院间转移的可能性。本研究试图填补医院竞争与患者转移关系研究方面的空白。
通过制定特定支付方的医院竞争水平,本研究评估了医院竞争对包括未参保者在内的不同类型支付方患者共享(或患者转移)的影响。对于患者转移,我们不是在患者层面关注患者是否从一家医院转移到另一家医院,而是在医院层面衡量医院之间(转入和转出)的患者转移数量。这些因变量——主要支付方的转出和转入患者数量——是计数变量,我们采用泊松回归模型或负二项回归模型。
在控制医院特征的情况下,当未参保者的赫芬达尔-赫希曼指数(HHI)增加0.01时,未参保者被转移到另一家医院的可能性增加593%。当一家医院在其市场中占据主导地位时,它往往会将未参保患者排挤到其他医院。
如果患者转移在医学上没有必要且主要是出于经济激励,卫生管理人员和政策制定者应尽量减少此类情况。由于入住主导医院市场的医院的未参保者在获得医疗服务方面可能更加脆弱,佛罗里达州政府需要朝着为符合条件的佛罗里达人增加医疗保险覆盖范围的方向努力。