Wilkinson Sam
Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old Elvet, Durham, DH1 3HN UK.
Rev Philos Psychol. 2016;7:389-404. doi: 10.1007/s13164-015-0260-5. Epub 2015 Apr 23.
I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox "bottom-up" aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and potentially more plausible accounts of these three cases. I reflect on how this mental files approach can be viewed either as a supplement to the orthodox aetiology, or as suggesting an altogether different aetiology. I end by addressing a concern surrounding the explanatory power of mental files.
我认为，我们可以从心理档案管理中的系统性错误角度来思考妄想性错认。我首先概述妄想性错认的正统“自下而上”病因学。我认为正统病因学可以有描述主义或单一主义的解释。我给出三个案例，描述主义解释需要对其作出说明。然后我引入一种基于心理档案的单一主义方法，并展示它如何为这三个案例提供不同且可能更合理的解释。我思考这种心理档案方法是可被视为对正统病因学的补充，还是暗示了一种截然不同的病因学。最后我探讨了围绕心理档案解释力的一个问题。
