Marchi Francesco
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Institut für Philosophie II, Office: GA 3/139, Universitätsstrasse 150, 44780 Bochum, Germany.
Conscious Cogn. 2017 Jan;47:48-62. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.06.014. Epub 2016 Jul 7.
A recent approach to the cognitive penetrability of perception, i.e. the possibility that perception is shaped top-down by high-level cognitive states such as beliefs and desires, proposes to understand the phenomenon on the basis of its consequences, among which there is a challenge for the epistemic role of perceptual experience in justifying beliefs (Stokes, 2015). In this paper, I argue that some attentional phenomena qualify as cases of cognitive penetrability under this consequentialist approach. I present a popular theory of attention, the biased-competition theory, on which basis I establish that attention is a form of metacognitive regulation. I argue that attention (as metacognitive regulation) involves the right kind of cognitive-perceptual relation and leads to the same epistemic consequences as other more traditional versions of cognitive penetrability.
最近有一种关于知觉的认知可穿透性的研究方法，即知觉有可能由诸如信念和欲望等高级认知状态自上而下地塑造，该方法建议根据其后果来理解这一现象，其中对知觉经验在确证信念中的认知作用构成了一项挑战（斯托克斯，2015）。在本文中，我认为在这种后果主义方法下，一些注意现象可被视为认知可穿透性的实例。我提出了一种流行的注意理论，即偏向竞争理论，并在此基础上确定注意是一种元认知调节形式。我认为注意（作为元认知调节）涉及正确类型的认知 - 知觉关系，并导致与其他更传统的认知可穿透性版本相同的认知后果。
