Hastings Cent Rep. 2016 Jul;46(4):13-9. doi: 10.1002/hast.600.
When prospective parents use in vitro fertilization, many of them hope to generate more embryos than they intend to implant immediately. The technology often requires multiple attempts to reach a successful pregnancy, and couples can cryopreserve any excess embryos so that they have them on hand for later attempts. As part of obtaining informed consent for IVF or cryopreservation, clinics typically ask patients to specify their preferences for the embryos in the event of divorce or death, offering options such as use of the embryos by a specified partner, donation to research, or discarding the remaining embryos. Still, many courts face a recurring problem: the partners dissolve their relationship (typically through divorce), and one party wants to use the frozen embryos over the objections of the other. Courts and legislatures have struggled with how to handle these cases, which seem to pit one partner's right to procreate against the other's right not to procreate. In this essay, we use one of the most recent decisions in this line of cases-the Appellate Court of Illinois's decision in Szafranski v. Dunston-to explain the current state of the law and make recommendations for changes. The issue is ripe for revisiting because in the last year, embryo disputes have become a battlefront for larger conflagrations over the moral status of embryos.
当准父母使用体外受精 (IVF) 技术时，他们中的许多人希望产生比他们打算立即植入的更多胚胎。这项技术通常需要多次尝试才能成功怀孕，并且夫妇可以冷冻保存任何多余的胚胎，以便在以后的尝试中使用。作为获得 IVF 或冷冻保存知情同意的一部分，诊所通常会要求患者在离婚或死亡的情况下指定他们对胚胎的偏好，提供的选择包括指定伴侣使用胚胎、捐赠给研究或丢弃剩余的胚胎。尽管如此，许多法院仍然面临一个反复出现的问题：伴侣解除关系（通常是通过离婚），一方希望使用冷冻胚胎，而另一方则反对生育。法院和立法机构一直在努力处理这些案件，这些案件似乎使一方的生育权与另一方的不生育权发生冲突。在本文中，我们将使用该系列案件中最新的一个决定——伊利诺伊州上诉法院在 Szafranski v. Dunston 案中的裁决——来解释当前的法律状况，并提出修改建议。这个问题亟待重新审视，因为在过去的一年里，胚胎纠纷已成为围绕胚胎道德地位的更大冲突的前沿阵地。
