Cohen Andrew L, Sidlowski Sara, Staub Adrian
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Massachusetts, 441 Tobin Hall, 135 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA, 01003-7701, USA.
Psychon Bull Rev. 2017 Jun;24(3):972-978. doi: 10.3758/s13423-016-1161-z.
We examine whether judgments of posterior probabilities in Bayesian reasoning problems are affected by reasoners' beliefs about corresponding real-world probabilities. In an internet-based task, participants were asked to determine the probability that a hypothesis is true (posterior probability, e.g., a person has a disease, given a positive medical test) based on relevant probabilities (e.g., that any person has the disease and the true and false positive rates of the test). We varied whether the correct posterior probability was close to, or far from, independent intuitive estimates of the corresponding 'real-world' probability. Responses were substantially closer to the correct posterior when this value was close to the intuitive estimate. A model in which the response is a weighted sum of the intuitive estimate and an additive combination of the probabilities provides an excellent account of the results.
我们研究了贝叶斯推理问题中后验概率的判断是否受到推理者对相应现实世界概率的信念的影响。在一项基于互联网的任务中，参与者被要求根据相关概率（例如，任何人患某种疾病的概率以及该测试的真阳性率和假阳性率）来确定一个假设为真的概率（后验概率，例如，某人在医学测试呈阳性的情况下患有某种疾病）。我们改变了正确的后验概率是接近还是远离对相应“现实世界”概率的独立直观估计。当这个值接近直观估计时，参与者的回答与正确的后验概率更接近。一个将回答视为直观估计与概率的加法组合的加权和的模型能够很好地解释这些结果。
