Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada.
Institute of Psychology, University of Wroclaw, Wroclaw, Poland.
Psychon Bull Rev. 2020 Apr;27(2):385-391. doi: 10.3758/s13423-020-01710-1.
Across two experiments (N=799) we demonstrate that people's use of quantitative information (e.g., base-rates) when making a judgment varies as the causal link of qualitative information (e.g., stereotypes) changes. That is, when a clear causal link for stereotypes is provided, people make judgments that are far more in line with them. When the causal link is heavily diminished, people readily incorporate non-causal base-rates into their judgments instead. We suggest that people use and integrate all of the information that is provided to them to make judgements, but heavily prioritize information that is causal in nature. Further, people are sensitive to the underlying causal structures in their environment and adapt their decision making as such.
在两项实验中(N=799),我们证明了人们在做出判断时对定量信息(例如,基本比率)的使用会随着定性信息(例如,刻板印象)的因果关系的变化而变化。也就是说,当提供了刻板印象的明确因果关系时,人们的判断就会更加符合刻板印象。当因果关系大大减弱时,人们会很容易将非因果基本比率纳入他们的判断中。我们认为,人们会使用和整合他们所提供的所有信息来做出判断,但会高度优先考虑具有因果关系的信息。此外,人们对环境中的潜在因果结构敏感,并据此调整他们的决策。