Bhat Mahadev G, Huffaker Ray G, Lenhart Suzanne M
Ecol Appl. 1993 Aug;3(3):518-530. doi: 10.2307/1941920.
The beaver (Castor canadensis) population in the United States has caused severe damage to valuable timberland through dam-building and flooding of bottomland forest. Traditionally, beavers have provided a source of livelihood to a small group of people. However, recent low pelt prices have failed to stimulate adequate trapping pressure, and thus have resulted in increased beaver populations and damage losses. The low trapping pressure has left the burden of nuisance control on property owners. Since beaver populations are mobile, beaver extermination in controlled parcels results in beaver immigration from neighboring less controlled parcels. Beaver migration from less controlled to controlled parcels imposes an external cost (negative diffusion externality) on the owners of controlled parcels because they must incur the future cost of trapping immigrating beavers. Unless all land owners agree to control the beaver population simultaneously, the diffusion externality can decrease the incentive of individual landowners to control nuisance beavers, thereby driving a wedge between social and private needs for such control. This study attempts to develop a bioeconomic model that incorporates dispersive population dynamics of beavers into the design of a cost-minimizing trapping strategy. Attention is focused on the situation where all landowners in a given habitat share a common interest in controlling beaver damages, and thus collectively agree to place the area-wide control decision in the hands of a public agency on a cost-sharing basis. The public manager is assumed to minimize the present value of combined timber damage and trapping costs over a finite period of time, subject to spatiotemporal dynamics of beaver population. These dynamics are summarized by a parabolic diffusive Volterra-Lotka partial differential equation, and the population control problem is cast in the framework of a distributed-parameter-control model. The cost-minimizing area-wide trapping model accounts for net migration at each location and time, and characterizes the beaver-control strategy that leaves sufficient beavers to strike an optimal balance between timber damage and trapping costs. The marginality condition governing this trade-off requires that avoided timber damage (measured as the imputed nuisance value, or "shadow price," of the beaver stock in the area) be balanced by trapping cost. The optimality system for this problem is solved numerically. The validity of the theoretical model is empirically examined using the bioeconomic data collected for the Wildlife Management Regions of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. Empirical simulation generates discrete values for optimal beaver densities and trapping rates across all individual operational units over time. The optimal trapping program causes the initially uneven population distribution to eventually smooth out across the habitat. The sensitivity analysis alternates trapping-cost and timber-damage parameters between high and low values. Increased trapping costs decrease the level of trapping in the initial years of the optimal program, thereby leaving more beavers in the habitat. This triggers more intensive trapping during the later years of the program, requires more beavers to be trapped over the entire time horizon, and results in a higher overall program cost. Alternatively, increased timber-damage potential calls for increased trapping in the initial years of the program. Fewer beavers are maintained in the habitat and less trapping is required in the later years. Perhaps surprisingly, this results in a smaller number of beavers trapped over the entire time horizon.
美国的海狸(加拿大海狸)种群通过筑坝和淹没低地森林,对宝贵的林地造成了严重破坏。传统上,海狸为一小部分人提供了生计来源。然而,近期海狸皮价格低迷,未能刺激足够的捕猎压力,从而导致海狸数量增加和破坏损失加剧。捕猎压力低下,使得控制海狸滋扰的负担落在了土地所有者身上。由于海狸种群具有流动性,在受控制区域捕杀海狸会导致海狸从相邻控制较少的区域迁入。海狸从不太受控制的区域向受控制区域迁移,给受控制区域的所有者带来了外部成本(负扩散外部性),因为他们必须承担未来捕杀迁入海狸的成本。除非所有土地所有者同时同意控制海狸数量,否则这种扩散外部性会降低个体土地所有者控制海狸滋扰的积极性,从而在社会对这种控制的需求和私人需求之间产生分歧。本研究试图建立一个生物经济模型,将海狸的扩散种群动态纳入成本最小化的捕猎策略设计中。研究重点关注给定栖息地内所有土地所有者在控制海狸破坏方面有共同利益,因此集体同意在成本分摊的基础上,将区域范围的控制决策交由公共机构负责的情况。假设公共管理者在有限时间内,使木材破坏和捕猎成本的现值之和最小化,同时考虑海狸种群的时空动态。这些动态由一个抛物型扩散的Volterra - Lotka偏微分方程总结,种群控制问题被置于一个分布参数控制模型的框架内。成本最小化的区域范围捕猎模型考虑了每个地点和时间的净迁移情况,并描述了一种海狸控制策略,即留下足够数量的海狸,以在木材破坏和捕猎成本之间达成最优平衡。支配这种权衡的边际条件要求避免的木材破坏(以该区域海狸种群的估算滋扰价值或“影子价格”衡量)与捕猎成本相平衡。通过数值方法求解该问题的最优性系统。利用为纽约州环境保护部野生动物管理区收集的生物经济数据,对理论模型的有效性进行实证检验。实证模拟生成了随时间变化的所有单个运营单位的最优海狸密度和捕猎率离散值。最优捕猎计划使最初不均匀的种群分布最终在整个栖息地变得平滑。敏感性分析在高值和低值之间交替改变捕猎成本和木材破坏参数。捕猎成本增加会降低最优计划最初几年的捕猎水平,从而在栖息地留下更多海狸。这会在计划后期引发更密集的捕猎,需要在整个时间范围内捕杀更多海狸,并导致总体计划成本更高。相反,木材破坏潜力增加则要求在计划最初几年增加捕猎。栖息地中维持的海狸数量减少,后期所需的捕猎量也减少。也许令人惊讶的是,这导致在整个时间范围内捕杀的海狸数量减少。