Suppr超能文献

质疑反事实思维的准备功能。

Questioning the preparatory function of counterfactual thinking.

作者信息

Mercier Hugo, Rolison Jonathan J, Stragà Marta, Ferrante Donatella, Walsh Clare R, Girotto Vittorio

机构信息

Institut des Sciences Cognitives Marc Jeannerod, CNRS Université Lyon 1 UMR5304, 67 Bd Pinel, 69675, Bron, France.

University of Essex, Colchester, UK.

出版信息

Mem Cognit. 2017 Feb;45(2):261-269. doi: 10.3758/s13421-016-0660-5.

Abstract

Why do individuals mentally modify reality (e.g., "If it hadn't rained, we would have won the game")? According to the dominant view, counterfactuals primarily serve to prepare future performance. In fact, individuals who have just failed a task tend to modify the uncontrollable features of their attempt (e.g., "If the rules of the game were different, I would have won it"), generating counterfactuals that are unlikely to play any preparatory role. By contrast, they generate prefactuals that focus on the controllable features of their ensuing behavior (e.g., "If I concentrate more, I will win the next game"). Here, we test whether this tendency is robust and general. Studies 1a and 1b replicate this tendency and show that it occurs regardless of whether individuals think about their failures or their successes. Study 2 shows that individuals generate relatively few controllable counterfactuals, unless explicitly prompted to do so. These results raise some questions regarding the generality of the dominant view according to which counterfactuals mainly serve a preparatory function.

摘要

为什么人们会在心理上改变现实(例如,“如果没下雨,我们就会赢得比赛”)?根据主流观点,反事实思维主要是为了为未来的表现做准备。事实上,刚刚在一项任务中失败的人往往会改变他们尝试过程中不可控的因素(例如,“如果游戏规则不同,我就会赢”),产生不太可能起到任何准备作用的反事实思维。相比之下,他们会产生注重后续行为可控因素的前事实思维(例如,“如果我更专注,我会赢得下一场比赛”)。在此,我们测试这种倾向是否稳固且具有普遍性。研究1a和1b重复了这种倾向,并表明无论人们是思考自己的失败还是成功,这种情况都会发生。研究2表明,除非明确受到提示,否则人们产生的可控反事实思维相对较少。这些结果对反事实思维主要起到准备功能的主流观点的普遍性提出了一些疑问。

文献AI研究员

20分钟写一篇综述,助力文献阅读效率提升50倍。

立即体验

用中文搜PubMed

大模型驱动的PubMed中文搜索引擎

马上搜索

文档翻译

学术文献翻译模型,支持多种主流文档格式。

立即体验