Brogaard Berit, Gatzia Dimitria E
Department of Philosophy, University of Miami.
Department of Philosophy, The University of Akron Wayne College.
Top Cogn Sci. 2017 Jan;9(1):193-214. doi: 10.1111/tops.12221. Epub 2016 Oct 31.
Is color experience cognitively penetrable? Some philosophers have recently argued that it is. In this paper, we take issue with the claim that color experience is cognitively penetrable. We argue that the notion of cognitive penetration that has recently dominated the literature is flawed since it fails to distinguish between the modulation of perceptual content by non-perceptual principles and genuine cognitive penetration. We use this distinction to show that studies suggesting that color experience can be modulated by factors of the cognitive system do not establish that color experience is cognitively penetrable. Additionally, we argue that even if color experience turns out to be modulated by color-related beliefs and knowledge beyond non-perceptual principles, it does not follow that color experience is cognitively penetrable since the experiences of determinate hues involve post-perceptual processes. We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications that these ideas may have on debates in philosophy.
颜色体验是否具有认知渗透性？最近一些哲学家认为它具有。在本文中，我们对颜色体验具有认知渗透性这一观点提出质疑。我们认为，最近在文献中占主导地位的认知渗透概念存在缺陷，因为它未能区分非感知原则对感知内容的调节与真正的认知渗透。我们利用这一区分来表明，那些表明颜色体验可由认知系统因素调节的研究，并不能证明颜色体验具有认知渗透性。此外，我们认为，即使颜色体验最终被证明是由超出非感知原则的与颜色相关的信念和知识所调节，也不能由此得出颜色体验具有认知渗透性，因为确定色调的体验涉及感知后过程。我们最后简要讨论了这些观点可能对哲学辩论产生的影响。
