Barlev Michael, Mermelstein Spencer, German Tamsin C
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara.
Cogn Sci. 2017 Apr;41 Suppl 3:425-454. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12435. Epub 2016 Nov 24.
This study tested the hypothesis that in the minds of adult religious adherents, acquired beliefs about the extraordinary characteristics of God coexist with, rather than replace, an initial representation of God formed by co-option of the evolved person concept. In three experiments, Christian religious adherents were asked to evaluate a series of statements for which core intuitions about persons and acquired Christian beliefs about God were consistent (i.e., true according to both [e.g., "God has beliefs that are true"] or false according to both [e.g., "All beliefs God has are false"]) or inconsistent (i.e., true on intuition but false theologically [e.g., "God has beliefs that are false"] or false on intuition but true theologically [e.g., "All beliefs God has are true"]). Participants were less accurate and slower to respond to inconsistent versus consistent statements, suggesting that the core intuitions both coexisted alongside and interfered with the acquired beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 2 when responding under time pressure participants were disproportionately more likely to make errors on inconsistent versus consistent statements than when responding with no time pressure, suggesting that the resolution of interference requires cognitive resources the functioning of which decreases under cognitive load. In Experiment 3 a plausible alternative interpretation of these findings was ruled out by demonstrating that the response accuracy and time differences on consistent versus inconsistent statements occur for God-a supernatural religious entity-but not for a natural religious entity (a priest).
在成年宗教信徒的观念中,后天获得的关于上帝非凡特质的信念与通过对进化而来的人格概念进行选择而形成的对上帝的初始表征共存,而非相互取代。在三项实验中,基督教信徒被要求评估一系列陈述,这些陈述中关于人的核心直觉与后天获得的关于上帝的基督教信念是一致的(即根据两者都是真的[例如,“上帝拥有正确的信念”]或两者都是假的[例如,“上帝拥有的所有信念都是假的”]),或者是不一致的(即直觉上是真的但从神学角度是假的[例如,“上帝拥有错误的信念”]或直觉上是假的但从神学角度是真的[例如,“上帝拥有的所有信念都是真的”])。与一致陈述相比,参与者对不一致陈述的反应准确性更低且速度更慢,这表明核心直觉既与后天获得的信念共存,又对其产生干扰(实验1和2)。在实验2中,当在时间压力下做出反应时,与没有时间压力时相比,参与者在不一致陈述上比在一致陈述上更容易出错,这表明干扰的解决需要认知资源,而在认知负荷下其功能会下降。在实验3中,通过证明对于上帝(一个超自然宗教实体)而非自然宗教实体(一位牧师),一致陈述与不一致陈述在反应准确性和时间上存在差异,排除了对这些发现的一种看似合理的替代解释。