Mermelstein Spencer, German Tamsin C
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States.
Front Psychol. 2021 Oct 5;12:739070. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.739070. eCollection 2021.
Epidemiological models of culture posit that the prevalence of a belief depends in part on the fit between that belief and intuitions generated by the mind's reliably developing architecture. Application of such models to pseudoscience suggests that one route via which these beliefs gain widespread appeal stems from their compatibility with these intuitions. For example, anti-vaccination beliefs are readily adopted because they cohere with intuitions about the threat of contagion. However, other varieties of popular pseudoscience such as astrology and parapsychology contain content that violates intuitions held about objects and people. Here, we propose a pathway by which "counterintuitive pseudoscience" may spread and receive endorsement. Drawing on recent empirical evidence, we suggest that counterintuitive pseudoscience triggers the mind's communication evaluation mechanisms. These mechanisms are hypothesized to quarantine epistemically-suspect information including counterintuitive pseudoscientific concepts. As a consequence, these beliefs may not immediately update conflicting intuitions and may be largely restricted from influencing behavior. Nonetheless, counterintuitive pseudoscientific concepts, when in combination with intuitively appealing content, may differentially draw attention and memory. People may also be motivated to seek further information about these concepts, including by asking others, in an attempt to reconcile them with prior beliefs. This in turn promotes the re-transmission of these ideas. We discuss how, during this information-search, support for counterintuitive pseudoscience may come from deference to apparently authoritative sources, reasoned arguments, and the functional outcomes of these beliefs. Ultimately, these factors promote the cultural success of counterintuitive pseudoscience but explicit endorsement of these concepts may not entail tacit commitment.
文化的流行病学模型认为,一种信念的流行程度部分取决于该信念与大脑可靠发展的结构所产生的直觉之间的契合度。将此类模型应用于伪科学表明,这些信念获得广泛吸引力的一条途径源于它们与这些直觉的兼容性。例如,反疫苗接种信念很容易被接受,因为它们与关于传染病威胁的直觉相契合。然而,其他种类的流行伪科学,如占星术和超心理学,包含一些违反人们对物体和人的直觉的内容。在此,我们提出了一条“反直觉伪科学”可能传播并获得认可的途径。基于最近的实证证据,我们认为反直觉伪科学会触发大脑的交流评估机制。据推测,这些机制会隔离包括反直觉伪科学概念在内的认知上可疑的信息。因此,这些信念可能不会立即更新相互冲突的直觉,并且可能在很大程度上受到限制而无法影响行为。尽管如此,反直觉伪科学概念与具有直观吸引力的内容相结合时,可能会有差异地吸引注意力和记忆。人们也可能有动力去寻求关于这些概念的更多信息,包括向他人询问,试图使它们与先前的信念相协调。这反过来又促进了这些观念的重新传播。我们讨论了在这种信息搜索过程中,对反直觉伪科学的支持可能来自对明显权威来源的尊重、合理的论证以及这些信念的功能性结果。最终,这些因素促进了反直觉伪科学在文化上的成功,但对这些概念的明确认可可能并不意味着默认接受。