Shinya Obayashi, Yusuke Inagaki, Hiroki Takikawa
Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, Bunkyo, Tokyo, Japan.
Survey Science Center, The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Tachikawa, Tokyo, Japan.
PLoS One. 2016 Nov 28;11(11):e0166437. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0166437. eCollection 2016.
Trust has been considered the "cement" of a society and is much studied in sociology and other social sciences. Most studies, however, have neglected one important aspect of trust: it involves an act of forgiving and showing tolerance toward another's failure. In this study, we refer to this concept as "generous trust" and examine the conditions under which generous trust becomes a more viable option when compared to other types of trust. We investigate two settings. First, we introduce two types of uncertainties: uncertainty as to whether trustees have the intention to cooperate, and uncertainty as to whether trustees have enough competence to accomplish the entrusted tasks. Second, we examine the manner in which trust functions in a broader social context, one that involves matching and commitment processes. Since we expect generosity or forgiveness to work differently in the matching and commitment processes, we must differentiate trust strategies into generous trust in the matching process and that in the commitment process. Our analytical strategy is two-fold. First, we analyze the "modified" trust game that incorporates the two types of uncertainties without the matching process. This simplified setting enables us to derive mathematical results using game theory, thereby giving basic insight into the trust mechanism. Second, we investigate socially embedded trust relationships in contexts involving the matching and commitment processes, using agent-based simulation. Results show that uncertainty about partner's intention and competence makes generous trust a viable option. In contrast, too much uncertainty undermines the possibility of generous trust. Furthermore, a strategy that is too generous cannot stand alone. Generosity should be accompanied with moderate punishment. As for socially embedded trust relationships, generosity functions differently in the matching process versus the commitment process. Indeed, these two types of generous trust coexist, and their coexistence enables a society to function well.
信任被视为社会的“黏合剂”，在社会学和其他社会科学领域得到了广泛研究。然而，大多数研究都忽略了信任的一个重要方面：它涉及对他人失败的原谅和宽容行为。在本研究中，我们将这一概念称为“慷慨信任”，并探讨与其他类型的信任相比，慷慨信任在何种条件下会成为更可行的选择。我们研究了两种情境。首先，我们引入两种不确定性：受托人是否有合作意愿的不确定性，以及受托人是否有足够能力完成受托任务的不确定性。其次，我们考察信任在更广泛社会背景下的运作方式，这种背景涉及匹配和承诺过程。由于我们预期慷慨或原谅在匹配和承诺过程中的作用方式不同，我们必须将信任策略区分为匹配过程中的慷慨信任和承诺过程中的慷慨信任。我们的分析策略有两个方面。首先，我们分析“修正”后的信任博弈，该博弈纳入了两种不确定性且没有匹配过程。这种简化的情境使我们能够运用博弈论得出数学结果，从而对信任机制有基本的洞察。其次，我们使用基于主体的模拟方法，研究涉及匹配和承诺过程的情境中社会嵌入的信任关系。结果表明，关于合作伙伴意图和能力的不确定性使慷慨信任成为一种可行的选择。相比之下，过多的不确定性会削弱慷慨信任的可能性。此外，过于慷慨的策略无法单独存在。慷慨应该伴随着适度的惩罚。至于社会嵌入的信任关系，慷慨在匹配过程和承诺过程中的作用方式不同。事实上，这两种类型的慷慨信任共存，它们的共存使社会能够良好运转。
