Gambetta Diego, Przepiorka Wojtek
European University Institute, Department of Political and Social Sciences, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy; Nuffield College, Oxford, United Kingdom.
Nuffield College, Oxford, United Kingdom; University of Oxford, Department of Sociology, Oxford, United Kingdom.
PLoS One. 2014 May 15;9(5):e97533. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0097533. eCollection 2014.
We exploit the fact that generosity and trustworthiness are highly correlated and the former can thus be a sign of the latter. Subjects decide between a generous and a mean split in a dictator game. Some of them are informed from the start that afterwards they will participate in a trust game and that their choice in the dictator game may matter; others are not informed in advance. In the trust game, before trusters decide whether or not to trust, some trustees can reveal (or conceal) only their true choice in the dictator game, while others can say to trusters, truthfully or otherwise, what they chose. We find that a generous choice made naturally by uninformed trustees and reliably revealed is more effective in persuading trusters to trust than a generous choice that could be strategic or a lie. Moreover, we find that, when they can, mean subjects lie and go on to be untrustworthy.
我们利用慷慨与可信赖高度相关这一事实，因此前者可以作为后者的一个标志。在独裁者博弈中，受试者要在慷慨分配和吝啬分配之间做出选择。其中一些人从一开始就被告知，之后他们将参与信任博弈，并且他们在独裁者博弈中的选择可能会有影响；其他人则未提前被告知。在信任博弈中，在信任者决定是否信任之前，一些受托人只能透露（或隐瞒）他们在独裁者博弈中的真实选择，而其他人可以对信任者如实或不实说出他们的选择。我们发现，不知情的受托人自然做出并可靠透露的慷慨选择，在说服信任者信任方面，比可能是策略性的或谎言的慷慨选择更有效。此外，我们发现，吝啬的受试者在能够说谎时就会说谎，并且随后变得不可信赖。
