Rawles J
Department of Medicine and Therapeutics, University of Aberdeen, Foresterhill.
J Med Ethics. 1989 Sep;15(3):143-7. doi: 10.1136/jme.15.3.143.
The ethical problem of how to apportion limited resources amongst the needy has been forced on us by arbitrary limitation of health expenditure. Its solution would not be required if health expenditure were higher. Distribution of resources according to best value for money, assessed as Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) per unit cost, has been suggested as a possible solution, but leads to absurd anomalies. In the calculation of QALYs the implied value of life is no more than the absence of suffering. The use of QALYs for the comparison of treatments that are symptomatic or life-saving therefore leads to serious undervaluation of life and treatments that prolong it. Moreover, distribution of resources by best value for money, however assessed, is inequitable since for a given degree of suffering those whose illnesses happen to be cheaper to treat will be treated in preference to those whose treatments are more expensive.
由于卫生支出的随意限制,我们不得不面对如何在有需要的人之间分配有限资源这一伦理问题。如果卫生支出更高,就无需解决这个问题。有人建议根据性价比来分配资源,以每单位成本的质量调整生命年(QALYs)来评估,这可能是一种解决方案,但会导致荒谬的异常情况。在计算QALYs时,生命的隐含价值仅仅是没有痛苦。因此,使用QALYs来比较对症治疗或挽救生命的治疗方法会导致对生命以及延长生命的治疗方法严重低估。此外,无论如何评估,按性价比分配资源都是不公平的,因为对于同等程度的痛苦,那些疾病治疗费用碰巧较低的人会比治疗费用较高的人更优先得到治疗。