Mooney G
University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
J Med Ethics. 1989 Sep;15(3):148-52. doi: 10.1136/jme.15.3.148.
John Rawles's criticism of QALYs are seen as being both imprecise and largely unhelpful. This paper accepts that there are problems in both QALYs themselves and in the current decision-making processes with which they seek to help. The QALY pliers tend to play down the former and the QALY knockers the latter. It is suggested that theories (regret theory and prospect theory) other than expected utility theory, which is normally seen as the basis for QALYs, may provide better approaches to measuring health service outputs. Thus equity, information and decision-making per se are not handled as well in the expected utility QALYs as they could be. Developing better QALYs, with qualifications, is the goal.
约翰·罗尔斯对质量调整生命年(QALYs)的批评被认为既不准确又基本上毫无帮助。本文承认质量调整生命年本身以及它们试图辅助的当前决策过程都存在问题。支持质量调整生命年的人往往淡化前者,而批评质量调整生命年的人则淡化后者。有人认为,除了通常被视为质量调整生命年基础的预期效用理论之外的其他理论(遗憾理论和前景理论),可能会为衡量卫生服务产出提供更好的方法。因此,在预期效用质量调整生命年中,公平、信息和决策本身并没有得到应有的妥善处理。目标是在具备一定条件的情况下开发出更好的质量调整生命年。