de Londras Fiona
Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK.
Med Law Rev. 2016 Autumn;24(4):591-607. doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fww040. Epub 2016 Dec 27.
Under the Irish Constitution abortion is allowed only where the life of the pregnant woman is at risk. The provision in question, Article 40.3.3 (or the 8th Amendment) has long been criticised for failing to respect women's autonomy, and in Mellet v Ireland, the UN Human Rights Committee found that Amanda Jane Mellet, who travelled to Liverpool to access abortion following a finding that her foetus suffered a fatal abnormality, had suffered a violation of her rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In this commentary I demonstrate the value of Mellet when compared to the possible legal findings in such circumstances under both the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, and argue that the findings are not restricted to cases of fatal foetal abnormality. Rather, the Committee's decision illustrates the suffering that all women in Ireland who travel to access abortion experience, arguably constituting a violation of their right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. On that reading, Mellet signifies the need to implement a comprehensive rethink of Irish abortion law including, but going beyond, access to abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality.
根据爱尔兰宪法,只有在孕妇生命受到威胁的情况下才允许堕胎。相关条款,即第40.3.3条(或第八修正案)长期以来一直因未能尊重女性自主权而受到批评。在梅利特诉爱尔兰案中,联合国人权事务委员会认定,阿曼达·简·梅利特在被发现胎儿患有致命畸形后前往利物浦堕胎,她的《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》(ICCPR)规定的权利受到了侵犯。在这篇评论中,我将梅利特案与在这种情况下根据宪法和《欧洲人权公约》可能做出的法律裁决进行比较,展示了梅利特案的价值,并认为这些裁决并不局限于胎儿致命畸形的情况。相反,委员会的决定表明了所有前往爱尔兰境外堕胎的女性所遭受的痛苦,可以说这侵犯了她们免受残忍、不人道和有辱人格待遇的权利。据此解读,梅利特案意味着有必要对爱尔兰堕胎法进行全面反思,包括但不限于胎儿致命畸形情况下的堕胎问题。