Sajeed Shihan, Huang Anqi, Sun Shihai, Xu Feihu, Makarov Vadim, Curty Marcos
Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 Canada.
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 Canada.
Phys Rev Lett. 2016 Dec 16;117(25):250505. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.117.250505.
Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (DDI-QKD) held the promise of being robust to detector side channels, a major security loophole in quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations. In contrast to what has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of DDI-QKD is not based on postselected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that DDI-QKD is in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit devices' imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are built by the legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus, free of malicious modifications, which is a key assumption in DDI-QKD.
探测器无关量子密钥分发（DDI-QKD）有望抵御探测器侧信道攻击，而这是量子密钥分发（QKD）实现中的一个主要安全漏洞。然而，与之前所宣称的不同，我们证明了DDI-QKD的安全性并非基于后选择纠缠，并且我们引入了各种窃听策略，这些策略表明DDI-QKD实际上容易受到探测器侧信道攻击以及利用接收器设备缺陷的其他攻击。即使QKD设备是由系统的合法用户自己构建的，因此没有恶意修改，我们的攻击仍然有效，而这是DDI-QKD中的一个关键假设。
