Parmigiani Giovanna, Mandarelli Gabriele, Meynen Gerben, Tarsitani Lorenzo, Biondi Massimo, Ferracuti Stefano
Department of Neurology and Psychiatry, "Sapienza" University of Rome, Rome, Italy.
Department of Criminal Law, Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands.
Riv Psichiatr. 2017 Jan-Feb;52(1):9-15. doi: 10.1708/2631.27049.
Free will has often been considered central to criminal responsibility. Yet, the concept of free will is also difficult to define and operationalize, and, moreover, it is intensely debated. In particular, the very existence of free will has been denied based on recent neuroscience findings. This debate has significant implications on those fields in which the link between free will and behaviour is the main focus of interest, such as forensic psychiatry. In fact, a tension is often experienced between the centrality of the notion of free will on the one hand, and its controversial status on the other. This tension needs to be addressed, especially in forensic psychiatry, since it is relevant for actual assessments of legal insanity. In the present paper we will try to operationalize “free will” using a fourpartite decision-making capacity model, which can be used in forensic assessment of insanity. We will describe its advantages and application to guide mental insanity assessments. Whereas free will is often considered problematic from a neuroscience perspective, this model, we argue, is compatible with neuroscience; moreover, evaluations using this model can also be informed and strengthened by neuroscientific findings, for example regarding inhibitory control.
自由意志常常被视为刑事责任的核心。然而，自由意志的概念也难以界定和实施，而且，它还引发了激烈的争论。特别是，基于最近的神经科学研究结果，自由意志的存在本身遭到了否定。这场争论对那些将自由意志与行为之间的联系作为主要关注点的领域有着重大影响，比如法医精神病学。事实上，一方面自由意志概念的核心地位，另一方面其备受争议的状态，这两者之间常常存在矛盾。这种矛盾需要得到解决，尤其是在法医精神病学领域，因为它与对法律认定精神错乱的实际评估相关。在本文中，我们将尝试使用一个四部分决策能力模型来实施“自由意志”，该模型可用于精神错乱的法医评估。我们将描述其优势以及在指导精神错乱评估方面的应用。虽然从神经科学的角度来看，自由意志常常被认为存在问题，但我们认为，这个模型与神经科学是兼容的；此外，使用这个模型进行的评估也可以借助神经科学研究结果，比如关于抑制控制的研究结果，得到启发和加强。
