Nanay Bence
University of Antwerp, Belgium; Peterhouse, University of Cambridge, UK.
Perception. 2017 Sep;46(9):1014-1026. doi: 10.1177/0301006617699225. Epub 2017 Apr 11.
Many philosophers use findings about sensory substitution devices in the grand debate about how we should individuate the senses. The big question is this: Is "vision" assisted by (tactile) sensory substitution really vision? Or is it tactile perception? Or some sui generis novel form of perception? My claim is that sensory substitution assisted "vision" is neither vision nor tactile perception, because it is not perception at all. It is mental imagery: visual mental imagery triggered by tactile sensory stimulation. But it is a special form of mental imagery that is triggered by corresponding sensory stimulation in a different sense modality, which I call "multimodal mental imagery."
许多哲学家在关于我们应如何区分各种感官的重大辩论中,运用了有关感官替代设备的研究结果。核心问题在于:借助(触觉)感官替代的“视觉”究竟算是视觉吗?还是触觉感知?亦或是某种独特的新型感知形式?我的观点是,感官替代辅助下的“视觉”既非视觉也非触觉感知,因为它根本就不是感知。它是心理意象:由触觉感官刺激引发的视觉心理意象。但它是一种特殊形式的心理意象,由不同感觉模态中的相应感官刺激所触发,我将其称为“多模态心理意象”。