Nanay Bence
University of Antwerp, D 413 Grote Kauwenberg 18, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium.
Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK.
Synthese. 2021;198(Suppl 17):4069-4080. doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-01937-5. Epub 2018 Sep 17.
I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: (a) one's perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one's intention to perform an action (everything else being equal) and (b) one's perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one's perceptual attention (everything else being equal). If we put these claims together, what we get is that one's perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one's intention to perform an action (everything else being equal).
我的目标是表明,知觉反事实地依赖于我们想要执行的动作。知觉并非通用的:我们想要做的事情确实会影响我们所看到的东西。在阐明这一主张如何不同于认知可穿透性辩论中所涉及的主张,以及反事实依赖在我的主张中意味着什么之后,我将给出一个分两步的论证:(a)一个人的知觉注意力反事实地依赖于其执行某个动作的意图(在其他条件相同的情况下),以及(b)一个人的知觉加工反事实地依赖于其知觉注意力(在其他条件相同的情况下)。如果我们将这些主张放在一起,我们得到的是,一个人的知觉加工反事实地依赖于其执行某个动作的意图(在其他条件相同的情况下)。