Han Jiaojie, Rapoport Amnon, Zhao Rui
Department of Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, Hubei, China.
School of Business Administration, University of California, Riverside, California, United States of America.
PLoS One. 2017 May 1;12(5):e0176721. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0176721. eCollection 2017.
The literature on team cooperation has neglected the effects of relative kindness intention on cooperation, which we measure by comparing the kindness intentions of an agent to her group members to the kindness shown by other members to this same agent. We argue that the agent's emotional reaction to material payoff inequity is not constant, but rather affected by her relative kindness intention. Then, we apply the model to team projects with multiple partners and investigate how inequity-aversion and relative kindness intention jointly influence team cooperation. We first consider the case of homogeneous agents, where their marginal productivity levels and technical capacities are the same, and then consider the case of heterogeneous agents, where their marginal productivity levels and technical capacities are not the same. Our results show that inequity-aversion has no effect on effort expenditure in the former case, but does affect it in the latter case. The consideration of relative kindness intention may impact the agents' optimal cooperative effort expenditure when their technical capacities are different. In addition, it is beneficial for team cooperation, and might not only reduce the negative impact but also enhance the positive impact of inequity-aversion on the agents' effort expenditures.
关于团队合作的文献忽略了相对善意意图对合作的影响,我们通过比较一个代理人对其团队成员的善意意图与其他成员对该代理人所表现出的善意来衡量这种影响。我们认为,代理人对物质收益不平等的情绪反应并非恒定不变,而是受其相对善意意图的影响。然后,我们将该模型应用于有多个合作伙伴的团队项目,并研究不平等厌恶和相对善意意图如何共同影响团队合作。我们首先考虑同质代理人的情况,即他们的边际生产率水平和技术能力相同,然后考虑异质代理人的情况,即他们的边际生产率水平和技术能力不同。我们的结果表明,在前一种情况下,不平等厌恶对努力支出没有影响,但在后一种情况下会产生影响。当代理人的技术能力不同时,对相对善意意图的考量可能会影响他们最优的合作努力支出。此外,这对团队合作有益,并且可能不仅会减少不平等厌恶对代理人努力支出的负面影响,还会增强其正面影响。