Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, Department of Brain & Cognition, University of Leuven (KU Leuven), Tiensestraat 102, box 3711, B-3000, Leuven, Belgium.
Visual Perception Laboratory, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Charité-Universitätsmedizin, Berlin, Germany.
Psychon Bull Rev. 2018 Feb;25(1):472-481. doi: 10.3758/s13423-017-1292-x.
A recent study claimed to have obtained evidence that participants can solve invisible multistep arithmetic equations (Sklar et al., 2012). The authors used a priming paradigm in which reaction times to targets congruent with the equation's solution were responded to faster compared with incongruent ones. We critically reanalyzed the data set of Sklar et al. and show that the claims being made in the article are not fully supported by the alternative analyses that we applied. A Bayesian reanalysis of the data accounting for the random variability of the target stimuli in addition to the subjects shows that the evidence for priming effects is less strong than initially claimed. That is, although Bayes factors revealed evidence for the presence of a priming effect, it was generally weak. Second, the claim that unconscious arithmetic occurs for subtraction but not for addition is not supported when the critical interaction is tested. Third, the data do not show well-established features of numerosity priming as derived from V-shaped response time curves for prime-target distances. Fourth, we show that it is impossible to classify reaction times as resulting from congruent or incongruent prime-target relationships, which should be expected if their results imply that participants genuinely solve the equations on each trial. We conclude that the claims being made in the original article are not fully supported by the analyses that we apply. Together with a recent failure to replicate the original results and a critique of the analysis based on regression to the mean, we argue that the current evidence for unconscious arithmetic is inconclusive. We argue that strong claims require strong evidence and stress that cumulative research strategies are needed to provide such evidence.
最近的一项研究声称已经获得了参与者可以解决看不见的多步骤算术方程的证据(Sklar 等人,2012)。作者使用了一种启动范式,其中与方程解一致的目标的反应时间比不一致的目标更快。我们批判性地重新分析了 Sklar 等人的数据,并表明文章中提出的主张并没有完全得到我们应用的替代分析的支持。对数据的贝叶斯重新分析考虑了目标刺激的随机可变性,除了主体之外,这表明启动效应的证据不如最初声称的那么强烈。也就是说,尽管贝叶斯因子显示出存在启动效应的证据,但它通常很弱。其次,当测试关键的交互作用时,减法无意识算术存在但加法无意识算术不存在的说法没有得到支持。第三,数据没有显示出数量启动的既定特征,因为从主-目标距离的 V 形反应时间曲线中得出的特征。第四,我们表明,不可能将反应时间分类为来自一致或不一致的主-目标关系,这应该是参与者在每次试验中真正解决方程的结果。我们得出的结论是,我们应用的分析并没有完全支持原始文章中的主张。结合最近未能复制原始结果以及对基于均值回归的分析的批评,我们认为无意识算术的当前证据尚无定论。我们认为,强有力的主张需要强有力的证据,并强调需要累积的研究策略来提供这种证据。