Osman Magda, Wiegmann Alex
1 Biology and Experimental Psychology Centre, Queen Mary University of London, UK.
2 Cognitive and Decision Sciences, Georg-Elias-Müller Institute of Psychology, University of Göttingen, Germany.
Exp Psychol. 2017 Mar;64(2):68-81. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000336.
In this review we make a simple theoretical argument which is that for theory development, computational modeling, and general frameworks for understanding moral psychology researchers should build on domain-general principles from reasoning, judgment, and decision-making research. Our approach is radical with respect to typical models that exist in moral psychology that tend to propose complex innate moral grammars and even evolutionarily guided moral principles. In support of our argument we show that by using a simple value-based decision model we can capture a range of core moral behaviors. Crucially, the argument we propose is that moral situations per se do not require anything specialized or different from other situations in which we have to make decisions, inferences, and judgments in order to figure out how to act.
在本综述中，我们提出一个简单的理论观点，即对于理论发展、计算建模以及理解道德心理学的一般框架而言，研究者应基于推理、判断和决策研究中的领域通用原则。相对于道德心理学中现有的典型模型，我们的方法较为激进，那些典型模型往往提出复杂的先天道德语法，甚至是受进化引导的道德原则。为支持我们的观点，我们表明通过使用一个简单的基于价值的决策模型，我们能够捕捉一系列核心道德行为。至关重要的是，我们提出的观点是，道德情境本身并不需要任何专门的东西，也与我们为了弄清楚如何行动而必须做出决策、推理和判断的其他情境并无不同。
