School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, 610000, China.
Tian Fu College of SouthWestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2019 Jun;26(17):16847-16854. doi: 10.1007/s11356-017-8767-1. Epub 2017 May 17.
This article studies the price competition and cooperation in a duopoly that is subjected to carbon emissions cap. The study assumes that in a departure from the classical Bertrand game, there is still a market for both firms' goods regardless of the product price, even though production capacity is limited by carbon emissions regulation. Through the decentralized decision making of both firms under perfect information, the results are unstable. The firm with the lower maximum production capacity under carbon emissions regulation and the firm with the higher maximum production capacity both seek market price cooperation. By designing an internal carbon credits trading mechanism, we can ensure that the production capacity of the firm with the higher maximum production capacity under carbon emissions regulation reaches price equilibrium. Also, the negotiation power of the duopoly would affect the price equilibrium.
本文研究了在受到碳排放上限约束的双头垄断中存在的价格竞争与合作问题。研究假设，与经典的伯特兰博弈不同，即使受到碳排放量管制限制了生产能力，两家公司的产品仍有市场，而与产品价格无关。通过在完全信息下两家公司的分散决策，结果是不稳定的。在碳排放量管制下具有较低最大生产能力的公司和具有较高最大生产能力的公司都寻求市场价格合作。通过设计内部碳信用交易机制，可以确保在碳排放量管制下具有较高最大生产能力的公司的生产能力达到价格均衡。此外，双头垄断的谈判能力也会影响价格均衡。
