Mattke Soeren, Liu Hangsheng, Hoch Emily, Mulcahy Andrew W
Rand Health Q. 2017 Jan 13;6(2):1. eCollection 2017 Jan.
In this article, Mattke and his colleagues discuss the risk that strategic behavior by health insurers could unravel the market for curative therapies for chronic diseases. Because the cost of these cures is front-loaded but the benefits accrue over time, insurers might attempt to delay treatment or avoid patients who require it, in the hope that they might change insurers. The authors discuss policy options to remedy this potential free-rider problem through alignment of incentives at the patient level, coordination among payers, and government intervention. They present a framework to analyze policy options and real-world case studies. While implementing those policy options is far from easy, stakeholders need to collaborate in order to establish equitable mechanisms that fairly distribute the cost and benefits of high-cost cures.
在本文中,马特克及其同事探讨了健康保险公司的战略行为可能破坏慢性病治疗市场的风险。由于这些治疗的成本是前期投入的,而收益是随着时间积累的,保险公司可能会试图推迟治疗或避开需要治疗的患者,希望他们会更换保险公司。作者讨论了通过在患者层面调整激励措施、付款人之间的协调以及政府干预来解决这一潜在搭便车问题的政策选择。他们提出了一个分析政策选择和现实案例研究的框架。虽然实施这些政策选择绝非易事,但利益相关者需要合作,以建立公平的机制,公平分配高成本治疗的成本和收益。