Kersten Luke
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK.
Rev Philos Psychol. 2017;8(3):501-517. doi: 10.1007/s13164-016-0322-3. Epub 2016 Oct 24.
The assumption that psychological states and processes are computational in character pervades much of cognitive science, what many call the computational theory of mind. In addition to occupying a central place in cognitive science, the computational theory of mind has also had a second life supporting "individualism", the view that psychological states should be taxonomized so as to supervene only on the intrinsic, physical properties of individuals. One response to individualism has been to raise the prospect of "wide computational systems", in which some computational units are instantiated outside the individual. "Wide computationalism" attempts to sever the link between individualism and computational psychology by enlarging the concept of computation. However, in spite of its potential interest to cognitive science, wide computationalism has received little attention in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This paper aims to revisit the prospect of wide computationalism. It is argued that by appropriating a mechanistic conception of computation wide computationalism can overcome several issues that plague initial formulations. The aim is to show that cognitive science has overlooked an important and viable option in computational psychology. The paper marshals empirical support and responds to possible objections.
心理状态和过程本质上是计算性的这一假设在认知科学中十分普遍，许多人将其称为心智的计算理论。除了在认知科学中占据核心地位外，心智的计算理论还衍生出了第二种观点，即支持“个体主义”，该观点认为心理状态的分类应仅取决于个体的内在物理属性。对个体主义的一种回应是提出“宽计算系统”的可能性，其中一些计算单元在个体之外实例化。“宽计算主义”试图通过扩大计算概念来切断个体主义与计算心理学之间的联系。然而，尽管宽计算主义对认知科学具有潜在的吸引力，但在心灵哲学和认知科学中却很少受到关注。本文旨在重新审视宽计算主义的前景。有人认为，通过采用计算的机械论概念，宽计算主义可以克服困扰初始表述的几个问题。目的是表明认知科学在计算心理学中忽略了一个重要且可行的选项。本文收集了实证支持并回应了可能的反对意见。
