Zhu Zhengqiu, Chen Bin, Reniers Genserik, Zhang Laobing, Qiu Sihang, Qiu Xiaogang
College of Information System and Management, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China.
Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Safety and Security Science Group (S3G), Delft University of Technology (TU Delft), 2628 BX Delft, The Netherlands.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2017 Sep 29;14(10):1155. doi: 10.3390/ijerph14101155.
The chemical industry is very important for the world economy and this industrial sector represents a substantial income source for developing countries. However, existing regulations on controlling atmospheric pollutants, and the enforcement of these regulations, often are insufficient in such countries. As a result, the deterioration of surrounding ecosystems and a quality decrease of the atmospheric environment can be observed. Previous works in this domain fail to generate executable and pragmatic solutions for inspection agencies due to practical challenges. In addressing these challenges, we introduce a so-called Chemical Plant Environment Protection Game (CPEP) to generate reasonable schedules of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations (i.e., daily management plans) for inspection agencies. First, so-called Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) in conjunction with source estimation methods are applied into this research. Second, high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations as well as gas sensor modules are modeled in the CPEP game. Third, simplified data analysis on the regularly discharging of chemical plants is utilized to construct the CPEP game. Finally, an illustrative case study is used to investigate the effectiveness of the CPEP game, and a realistic case study is conducted to illustrate how the models and algorithms being proposed in this paper, work in daily practice. Results show that playing a CPEP game can reduce operational costs of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations. Moreover, evidence suggests that playing the game leads to more compliance from the chemical plants towards the inspection agencies. Therefore, the CPEP game is able to assist the environmental protection authorities in daily management work and reduce the potential risks of gaseous pollutants dispersion incidents.
化学工业对世界经济非常重要,该工业部门是发展中国家的重要收入来源。然而,这些国家现有的大气污染物控制法规及其执行情况往往不够充分。因此,可以观察到周边生态系统的恶化和大气环境质量的下降。由于实际挑战,该领域以前的工作未能为检查机构生成可执行和实用的解决方案。为应对这些挑战,我们引入了一种所谓的化工厂环境保护博弈(CPEP),为检查机构生成高精度空气质量监测站的合理时间表(即日常管理计划)。首先,将所谓的斯塔克尔伯格安全博弈(SSG)与源估计方法应用于本研究。其次,在CPEP博弈中对高精度空气质量监测站以及气体传感器模块进行建模。第三,利用化工厂定期排放的简化数据分析来构建CPEP博弈。最后,通过一个说明性案例研究来调查CPEP博弈的有效性,并进行一个实际案例研究来说明本文提出的模型和算法在日常实践中的工作方式。结果表明,进行CPEP博弈可以降低高精度空气质量监测站的运营成本。此外,有证据表明,进行该博弈会使化工厂对检查机构的合规性更高。因此,CPEP博弈能够协助环境保护当局进行日常管理工作,并降低气态污染物扩散事件的潜在风险。