MTT Agrifood Research Finland, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland.
J Hazard Mater. 2011 Feb 15;186(1):401-6. doi: 10.1016/j.jhazmat.2010.11.013. Epub 2010 Nov 11.
The present paper provides a game theoretic analysis of strategic cooperation on safety and security among chemical companies within a chemical industrial cluster. We suggest a two-stage sequential move game between adjacent chemical plants and the so-called Multi-Plant Council (MPC). The MPC is considered in the game as a leader player who makes the first move, and the individual chemical companies are the followers. The MPC's objective is to achieve full cooperation among players through establishing a subsidy system at minimum expense. The rest of the players rationally react to the subsidies proposed by the MPC and play Nash equilibrium. We show that such a case of conflict between safety and security, and social cooperation, belongs to the 'coordination with assurance' class of games, and we explore the role of cluster governance (fulfilled by the MPC) in achieving a full cooperative outcome in domino effects prevention negotiations. The paper proposes an algorithm that can be used by the MPC to develop the subsidy system. Furthermore, a stepwise plan to improve cross-company safety and security management in a chemical industrial cluster is suggested and an illustrative example is provided.
本文针对化工产业集群内的化工企业在安全保障方面的战略合作问题进行了博弈论分析。我们提出了一种两阶段序贯博弈模型，涉及相邻化工厂和所谓的多厂委员会（MPC）之间的博弈。在博弈中，MPC 被视为领导者，首先行动，而各个化工企业则是跟随者。MPC 的目标是通过建立补贴制度以最小的成本实现玩家之间的完全合作。其余的玩家会根据 MPC 提出的补贴方案进行理性反应，并达到纳什均衡。我们表明，这种安全保障与社会合作之间的冲突属于“保证协调”类博弈，并探讨了集群治理（由 MPC 履行）在多米诺效应预防谈判中实现完全合作结果的作用。本文提出了一种 MPC 可以用来制定补贴制度的算法。此外，还提出了一个逐步改进化工产业集群内跨公司安全管理的计划，并提供了一个实例。
