Universiteit Antwerpen, Antwerp Research Group on Security and Security, Prinsstraat 13, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium.
J Hazard Mater. 2010 May 15;177(1-3):167-74. doi: 10.1016/j.jhazmat.2009.12.013. Epub 2009 Dec 6.
Every company situated within a chemical cluster faces the risk of being struck by an escalating accident at one of its neighbouring plants (the so-called external domino effect risks). These cross-plant risks can be reduced or eliminated if neighbouring companies are willing to invest in systems and measures to prevent them. However, since reducing such multi-plant risks does not lead to direct economic benefits, enterprises tend to be reluctant to invest more than needed for meeting minimal legal requirements and they tend to invest without collaborating. The suggested approach in this article indicates what information is required to evaluate the available investment options in external domino effects prevention. To this end, game theory is used as a promising scientific technique to investigate the decision-making process on investments in prevention measures simultaneously involving several plants. The game between two neighbouring chemical plants and their strategic investment behaviour regarding the prevention of external domino effects is described and an illustrative example is provided. Recommendations are formulated to advance cross-plant prevention investments in a two-company cluster.
每个位于化工集群中的公司都面临着其邻厂发生事故升级而受到影响的风险（即所谓的外部多米诺效应风险）。如果邻厂愿意投资于系统和措施来预防这些跨厂风险，则可以降低或消除这些风险。然而，由于减少这种多厂风险不会带来直接的经济效益，企业往往不愿意投资超过满足最低法律要求所需的金额，而且往往在没有协作的情况下进行投资。本文提出的方法指出了评估外部多米诺效应预防措施的可用投资方案所需的信息。为此，博弈论被用作一种有前途的科学技术，以研究同时涉及多个工厂的预防措施投资的决策过程。描述了两个邻接的化工厂之间的博弈以及它们在预防外部多米诺效应方面的战略投资行为，并提供了一个说明性的例子。为促进两厂集群中的跨厂预防投资制定了建议。
