Miuccio Michael, Liu Ka-Yuet, Lau Hakwan, Peters Megan A K
Department of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, United States of America.
Department of Sociology, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, United States of America.
PLoS One. 2017 Oct 4;12(10):e0185900. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0185900. eCollection 2017.
To achieve faculty status, graduating doctoral students have to substantially outperform their peers, given the competitive nature of the academic job market. In an ideal, meritocratic world, factors such as prestige of degree-granting university ought not to overly influence hiring decisions. However, it has recently been reported that top-ranked universities produced about 2-6 times more faculty than did universities that were ranked lower [1], which the authors claim suggests the use of un-meritocratic factors in the hiring process: how could students from top-ranked universities be six times more productive than their peers from lower-ranked universities? Here we present a signal detection model, supported by computer simulation and simple proof-of-concept example data from psychology departments in the U.S., to demonstrate that substantially higher rates of faculty production need not require substantially (and unrealistically) higher levels of student productivity. Instead, a high hiring threshold due to keen competition is sufficient to cause small differences in average student productivity between universities to result in manifold differences in placement rates. Under this framework, the previously reported results are compatible with a purely meritocratic system. Whereas these results do not necessarily mean that the actual faculty hiring market is purely meritocratic, they highlight the difficulty in empirically demonstrating that it is not so.
鉴于学术就业市场的竞争性质,为了获得教职,即将毕业的博士生必须大幅超越同龄人。在一个理想的、任人唯贤的世界里,授予学位的大学的声望等因素不应过度影响招聘决策。然而,最近有报道称,排名靠前的大学产生的教职员工数量比排名靠后的大学多出约2至6倍[1],作者声称这表明在招聘过程中使用了非任人唯贤的因素:排名靠前的大学的学生怎么可能比排名靠后的大学的同龄人高出六倍的生产力呢?在这里,我们提出一个信号检测模型,该模型得到了计算机模拟以及来自美国心理学系的简单概念验证示例数据的支持,以证明教职员工产出率大幅提高并不一定需要学生生产力大幅(且不切实际地)提高。相反,由于激烈竞争导致的高招聘门槛足以使大学之间平均学生生产力的微小差异导致就业安置率的多重差异。在此框架下,先前报道的结果与纯粹任人唯贤的体系是相容的。虽然这些结果不一定意味着实际的教职员工招聘市场是纯粹任人唯贤的,但它们凸显了从经验上证明并非如此的困难。