Shaw Jamie
Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, Canada.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2017 Aug;64:11-21. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.002. Epub 2017 Jun 29.
The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchism, characterized by the slogan 'anything goes', was not a positive proposal but the conclusion of a reductio argument against his opponents (Lloyd 1997; Staley 1999; Munévar 2000; Farrell 2003; Tsou 2003; Oberheim 2006; Roe 2009). This makes anarchism a mere criticism rather than a substantive position in its own right. In this paper, I argue that Feyerabend held anarchism as a positive thesis. Specifically, I present two possible interpretations of anarchism: one where anarchism is entailed by Feyerabend's radical view of pluralism and another where scientists must be 'methodological opportunists', which Feyerabend held simultaneously from at least 1970. I then consider how these positions fare against the more influential criticisms of anarchism (Nagel 1977; Worrall 1978; Godfrey-Smith 2003). I conclude by suggesting two avenues to constraining a literal interpretation of 'anything goes' on Feyerabendian grounds.
关于费耶阿本德的二手文献中几乎达成的共识是,他以“怎么都行”这一口号为特征的认识论无政府主义,并非一个积极的提议,而是针对其对手的归谬论证的结论(劳埃德,1997;斯泰利,1999;穆内瓦尔,2000;法雷尔,2003;邹,2003;奥伯海姆,2006;罗,2009)。这使得无政府主义仅仅成为一种批评,而非一种具有实质意义的自身立场。在本文中,我认为费耶阿本德将无政府主义视为一个积极的论点。具体而言,我提出了对无政府主义的两种可能解读:一种是无政府主义由费耶阿本德激进的多元主义观点推导得出,另一种是科学家必须是“方法论机会主义者”,费耶阿本德至少从1970年起就同时持有这两种观点。然后,我思考这些立场如何应对针对无政府主义更具影响力的批评(内格尔,1977;沃拉尔,1978;戈弗雷 - 史密斯,2003)。最后,我提出两条途径,以基于费耶阿本德的观点对“怎么都行”进行字面解释加以限制。