Chair of Experimental Cognitive Psychology, Collège de France, 11 Place Marcelin Berthelot, 75005 Paris, France.
Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives (CEA), INSERM, Université Paris-Sud, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin center, 91191 Gif/Yvette, France.
Science. 2017 Oct 27;358(6362):486-492. doi: 10.1126/science.aan8871.
The controversial question of whether machines may ever be conscious must be based on a careful consideration of how consciousness arises in the only physical system that undoubtedly possesses it: the human brain. We suggest that the word "consciousness" conflates two different types of information-processing computations in the brain: the selection of information for global broadcasting, thus making it flexibly available for computation and report (C1, consciousness in the first sense), and the self-monitoring of those computations, leading to a subjective sense of certainty or error (C2, consciousness in the second sense). We argue that despite their recent successes, current machines are still mostly implementing computations that reflect unconscious processing (C0) in the human brain. We review the psychological and neural science of unconscious (C0) and conscious computations (C1 and C2) and outline how they may inspire novel machine architectures.
是否机器可能具有意识，这是一个有争议的问题，必须基于对意识如何在唯一无疑拥有意识的物理系统——人类大脑——中产生的仔细考虑。我们认为，“意识”这个词混淆了大脑中两种不同类型的信息处理计算：用于全球广播的信息选择，从而使其可灵活用于计算和报告（C1，第一种意义上的意识），以及对这些计算的自我监控，导致主观的确定性或错误感（C2，第二种意义上的意识）。我们认为，尽管最近取得了成功，但当前的机器仍主要实现反映人类大脑中无意识处理（C0）的计算。我们回顾了无意识（C0）和意识计算（C1 和 C2）的心理学和神经科学，并概述了它们如何启发新的机器架构。
