Departamento de Ciencias de la Computación e I. A., CITIC-UGR, Universidad de Granada, 18071, Granada, Spain.
Sci Eng Ethics. 2019 Feb;25(1):265-283. doi: 10.1007/s11948-017-9998-8. Epub 2017 Oct 27.
This paper shows that, for a large range of parameters, the journal editor prefers to delegate the choice to review the manuscript to the biased referee. If the peer review process is informative and the review reports are costly for the reviewers, even biased referees with extreme scientific preferences may choose to become informed about the manuscript's quality. On the contrary, if the review process is potentially informative but the reviewer reports are not costly for the referees, the biased reviewer has no incentive to become informed about the manuscript. Furthermore, if the reports are costly for referees but the peer review processes are not potentially informative, the biased reviewers will never become informed. In this paper, we also present a web resource that helps editors to experiment with the review process as a device for information transmission.
本文表明，在很大的参数范围内，期刊编辑更倾向于将选择审稿人的权力委托给有偏见的审稿人。如果同行评审过程是有信息含量的，并且审稿报告对审稿人来说成本很高，那么即使是具有极端科学偏好的有偏见的审稿人也可能会选择了解手稿的质量。相反，如果评审过程具有潜在的信息含量，但审稿报告对审稿人来说成本不高，那么有偏见的审稿人就没有动力去了解手稿的质量。此外，如果审稿报告对审稿人来说成本很高，但同行评审过程没有潜在的信息含量，那么有偏见的审稿人将永远不会获得信息。在本文中，我们还提供了一个网络资源，帮助编辑们将评审过程作为一种信息传递的手段进行实验。
