Piredda Giulia
Istituto Universitario di Studi Superiori di Pavia (IUSS), Pavia, Italy.
Front Psychol. 2017 Nov 28;8:2061. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02061. eCollection 2017.
Clark and Chalmers (1998) introduced the extended mind hypothesis, according to which some mental states can be realized by non-biological external resources. A lively debate has flourished around this hypothesis, connected with the issues of embodiment, embeddedness, situatedness and enaction (cf. Clark, 2008; Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011). Two of the main criticisms addressed to the functionalist version of the extended mind thesis have been the so-called "coupling-constitution fallacy" and the alleged lack of a mark of the cognitive (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2010a,b). According to Adams and Aizawa, extended cognition is a logical possibility, but is not instantiated in our world. Following this view, they defend a "contingent intracranialism," based on a specific mark of the cognitive that they propose. In this paper I intend to show that neither criticism is effective against the extended cognition thesis. In particular: the mark of the cognitive proposed by Adams and Aizawa does not secure contingent intracranialism;the coupling-constitution fallacy criticizes extended cognition on precisely the point the theory was intended to defend: namely, that the best way to individuate cognitive systems, given a minimal mark of the cognitive, is to rely on coupling relations between agents and environmental resources.
克拉克和查尔默斯（1998）提出了延展心灵假说，根据该假说，某些心理状态可以由非生物的外部资源实现。围绕这一假说展开了一场热烈的辩论，这场辩论与具身性、嵌入性、情境性和生成性等问题相关（参见克拉克，2008；梅纳里，2010；夏皮罗，2011）。针对延展心灵论题的功能主义版本的两项主要批评是所谓的“耦合-构成谬误”以及所谓的缺乏认知标志（亚当斯和艾泽瓦，2001、2005、2009、2010a、b）。根据亚当斯和艾泽瓦的观点，延展认知在逻辑上是可能的，但在我们的世界中并未实例化。按照这种观点，他们基于自己提出的一种特定的认知标志，捍卫一种“偶然的颅内主义”。在本文中，我打算表明这两种批评都无法有效反驳延展认知论题。具体而言：亚当斯和艾泽瓦提出的认知标志并不能确保偶然的颅内主义；耦合-构成谬误恰恰在该理论旨在捍卫的要点上批评了延展认知，即：在给定认知的最小标志的情况下，对认知系统进行个体化的最佳方式是依赖主体与环境资源之间的耦合关系。
