van Gelder T
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia.
Behav Brain Sci. 1998 Oct;21(5):615-28; discussion 629-65. doi: 10.1017/s0140525x98001733.
According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, and only sustained empirical research in cognitive science will determine the extent to which that is true.
根据认知科学中占主导地位的计算方法,认知主体是数字计算机;而根据另一种方法,它们是动力系统。本文旨在阐述并支持动力系统假说。该假说有两个主要组成部分:本质假说(认知主体是动力系统)和知识假说(认知主体可以从动力学角度来理解)。针对这一假说的诸多反对意见都可以被反驳。结论是认知系统很可能是动力系统,而只有认知科学中持续的实证研究才能确定这一观点的正确程度。