UNSW, Australia, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia.
UNSW, Australia, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia.
Int J Drug Policy. 2018 Jan;51:148-155. doi: 10.1016/j.drugpo.2017.11.002. Epub 2017 Dec 20.
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 1988 ("1988 Convention") expresses a strong normative preference for criminalising drug possession. Historically, the United Nations offices responsible for overseeing the treaties have held that decriminalisation of drug possession is contrary to the treaties. Leading up to and during UNGASS 2016, however, rather than emphasise criminalisation, the high-ranking officials from the drug control offices emphasised the treaties' allowance of alternatives to punishment for drug possession offences.
This paper applies transnational social movement theory to analyse the political opportunity structure for drug law reform at the UN. Data was collected from documents created by important United Nations agencies in the lead up to UNGASS 2016. By analysing the statements of prominent UN officials within a social movement theory framework, we can assess whether those responsible for administering global drug policy are offering concession to drug law reform social movement and whether a political opportunity structure is opening up for drug law reformers to pursue further reforms.
from the United Nations documents demonstrated significant reference to local drug law reforms and the benefits of non-punitive treatment of drug users. However, given the strong normative preference and mandatory language ("shall") in the 1988 Convention, policy leaders at the UN can only offer very moderate concessions to drug law reformers - primarily the advocacy of alternatives to incarceration. Such policies still suffer many problems caused by using the criminal justice system to funnel people into treatment. Indeed, many other offices at the UN explicitly drew attention to the problem of pre-trial punishment in their contributions to UNGASS 2016.
A schism is developing at the UN as other UN offices are pointing out that advocating for alternatives to punishment is inadequate due to the many problems of "pre-trial punishment". Social movement theory suggests that this schism represents an opening of the political opportunity structure as advocates for drug law reform can now more forcefully criticise, and even breach, the treaties and will have high-level support at the UN.
1988 年《联合国禁止非法贩运麻醉药品和精神药物公约》(“1988 年公约”)强烈倾向于将持有毒品定罪。从历史上看,负责监督这些条约的联合国各办事处一直认为,将持有毒品非刑罪化有悖于这些条约。然而,在 2016 年联合国大会特别会议之前和期间,毒品管制办公室的高级官员并未强调将持有毒品定罪,而是强调这些条约允许对持有毒品罪采用替代惩罚办法。
本文应用跨国社会运动理论分析联合国毒品法律改革的政治机会结构。数据来自在 2016 年联合国大会特别会议之前由重要的联合国机构编写的文件。通过在社会运动理论框架内分析联合国知名官员的言论,我们可以评估负责管理全球毒品政策的人员是否向毒品法律改革社会运动让步,以及是否为毒品法律改革者进一步改革开辟了政治机会结构。
从联合国文件中可以明显看出,这些文件提到了地方毒品法律改革和对吸毒者非惩罚性待遇的好处。然而,鉴于 1988 年公约强烈的规范性倾向和强制性措辞(“应”),联合国的政策制定者只能向毒品法律改革者做出非常适度的让步,主要是倡导采用监禁替代办法。这些政策仍然存在许多问题,即利用刑事司法系统将人送进治疗机构。事实上,联合国其他许多机构在向 2016 年联合国大会特别会议提交的报告中明确指出了审前惩罚的问题。
联合国内部正在出现分歧,因为其他联合国机构指出,由于“审前惩罚”存在许多问题,倡导替代惩罚是不够的。社会运动理论表明,这种分歧代表着政治机会结构的开放,因为毒品法律改革的倡导者现在可以更有力地批评甚至违反这些条约,并在联合国获得高级别支持。