Chierchia Gabriele, Nagel Rosemarie, Coricelli Giorgio
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Science, department of Social Neuroscience, Leipzig, Germany.
University of Trento, Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, Rovereto, Italy.
Sci Rep. 2018 Feb 23;8(1):3514. doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-21962-1.
Uncertainty in the form of risk or ambiguity can arise from the interaction with nature and other players, while strategic uncertainty arises only in interactions with others. Here, we systematically compare binary decisions between a safe option and a potentially higher paying but uncertain option in four experimental conditions with the same potential monetary outcomes: coordination vs. anti coordination games, as well as risky and ambiguous lotteries. In each condition, we progressively increase the value of the safe option and measure subjects' certainty equivalents (i.e., the specific safe payoff-threshold that makes a subject indifferent between the two options). We find that anti-coordination games and ambiguous lotteries elicit equally high aversion to uncertainty, relative to the other domains. In spite of this similarity, we find that subjects alternate between the safe and uncertain options much more frequently, thus displaying higher entropy, under anti-coordination relative to any of the other environments. These differences are predicted by theories of recursive reasoning in strategic games (e.g., thinking what others think we think etc.). Indeed, this can occur when interacting with intentional counterparts, but not with nature.
风险或模糊性形式的不确定性可能源于与自然及其他参与者的相互作用，而战略不确定性仅产生于与他人的互动中。在此，我们在四种实验条件下，对一个安全选项和一个潜在收益更高但不确定的选项之间的二元决策进行系统比较，这些条件具有相同的潜在货币结果：协调博弈与反协调博弈，以及风险和模糊彩票。在每种条件下，我们逐步提高安全选项的价值，并测量受试者的确定性等价物（即使受试者在两个选项之间无差异的特定安全收益阈值）。我们发现，相对于其他领域，反协调博弈和模糊彩票引发了同样高的不确定性厌恶。尽管存在这种相似性，但我们发现，在反协调环境下，受试者在安全选项和不确定选项之间切换的频率要高得多，从而表现出更高的熵，这相对于任何其他环境而言。这些差异可由战略博弈中的递归推理理论（例如，思考他人认为我们在思考什么等）预测。事实上，当与有意图的对手互动时会出现这种情况，但与自然互动时则不会。
