医疗保险“人”：信息摩擦、计划选择和消费者福利。
Health Insurance for "Humans": Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare.
机构信息
Department of Economics, University of California-Berkeley, Berkeley, CA.
Haas School of Business, University of California-Berkeley, Berkeley, CA.
出版信息
Am Econ Rev. 2015 Aug;105(8):2449-500. doi: 10.1257/aer.20131126.
Traditional models of insurance choice are predicated on fully informed and rational consumers protecting themselves from exposure to financial risk. In practice, choosing an insurance plan is a complicated decision often made without full information. In this paper we combine new administrative data on health plan choices and claims with unique survey data on consumer information to identify risk preferences, information frictions, and hassle costs. Our additional friction measures are important predictors of choices and meaningfully impact risk preference estimates. We study the implications of counterfactual insurance allocations to illustrate the importance of distinguishing between these micro-foundations for welfare analysis.
传统的保险选择模式基于充分知情和理性的消费者保护自己免受财务风险的影响。实际上，选择保险计划是一个复杂的决策，通常是在不完全了解信息的情况下做出的。在本文中，我们将健康计划选择和索赔的新行政数据与消费者信息的独特调查数据相结合，以确定风险偏好、信息摩擦和麻烦成本。我们的额外摩擦措施是选择的重要预测指标，并且对风险偏好估计产生有意义的影响。我们研究了反事实保险分配的影响，以说明在福利分析中区分这些微观基础的重要性。
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