Botbol-Baum Mylène
J Int Bioethique Ethique Sci. 2016 Dec 19;27(3):35-52. doi: 10.3917/jib.273.0035.
The use of the category of vulnerability has been multiplied in moral philosophy social sciences and bioethics. Being vulnerable can refer rhetorically to all mortal agents, but also to those lacking agency which makes of it a very ambiguous notion. The notion of vulnerability is part of everyday language and is mostly perceived as a determination which limits our aspirations to autonomy. Why has it become a notion a bioethical principle or concept per se? Historically, anthropology of the vulnerable subject is needed and can be found in the work of Nussbaum and Honneth which could be used in bioethical discourse. The link between care theory and capability of recognition theories developed by Sen and Nussbaum, enrich the picture. Vulnerability we will argue does not have to be from an anthropological point of view, exposition to dependence and exploitation.
“脆弱性”这一范畴在道德哲学、社会科学和生物伦理学中的应用成倍增加。从修辞角度看，脆弱性可以指代所有终有一死的人，但也可指那些缺乏能动性的人，这使得它成为一个非常模糊的概念。脆弱性概念是日常语言的一部分，大多被视为一种限制我们对自主性追求的限定因素。为何它本身会成为一个生物伦理学的概念、原则或理念呢？从历史角度看，需要对脆弱主体进行人类学研究，这在努斯鲍姆和霍耐特的著作中可以找到，这些研究可用于生物伦理学论述。森和努斯鲍姆提出的关怀理论与承认理论能力之间的联系，丰富了这一图景。我们认为，从人类学角度看，脆弱性不一定意味着易受依赖和剥削。
