DiEuliis Diane, Gronvall Gigi Kwik
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, USA.
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA.
mSphere. 2018 Mar 7;3(2). doi: 10.1128/mSphere.00074-18. eCollection 2018 Mar-Apr.
The re-creation of horsepox virus, an extinct orthopoxvirus with similarity to smallpox virus, has caused concerns in the biosecurity and biodefense communities that the technical capabilities achieved could advance the re-creation of smallpox virus by nefarious actors. The work is now published. While the authors went through due biosecurity diligence at their research institution and with the proper Canadian federal authorities, now that the experiments have been published, there is an opportunity to discuss the dual use risks and benefits of the research itself, as well as those associated with publication of such research-all of which challenge current policies. Here, an analytical framework is used to assess the risks and benefits of such dual use research, and relevant components of biosecurity policy and the biodefense enterprise (including the acquisition of medical countermeasures) in the United States are discussed. The authors emphasize the need to use such risk/benefit assessments at the onset of research and throughout its development, followed by an assessment for its responsible communication.
马痘病毒是一种已灭绝的正痘病毒，与天花病毒相似，其再造引起了生物安全和生物防御领域的担忧，即所取得的技术能力可能会被恶意行为者用于推进天花病毒的再造。这项研究成果现已发表。虽然作者在其研究机构以及与加拿大联邦相关部门进行了适当的生物安全审查，但既然实验已经发表，就有机会来讨论这项研究本身的两用风险和益处，以及与这类研究发表相关的风险和益处——所有这些都对现行政策构成了挑战。在此，运用一个分析框架来评估此类两用研究的风险和益处，并讨论美国生物安全政策和生物防御事业的相关组成部分（包括医疗对策的获取）。作者强调，在研究开始时及其整个发展过程中都需要进行此类风险/益处评估，随后还要对其负责任的传播进行评估。
