Greaney T L, Sindelar J L
St. Louis University School of Law.
Inquiry. 1987 Winter;24(4):384-91.
Although preferred provider organizations (PPOs) sponsored by third parties are likely to offer benefits to society through increased competition, those sponsored by providers may generate a risk of anticompetitive collusion. Such cartellike collusion could result in price fixing, less aggressive utilization review, and restrictions on entry and innovation in the market. In this article, we provide guidance on the potential risks posed by provider-sponsored PPOs. We suggest that public policy should generally promote PPOs and remove regulatory barriers to their growth because of their cost containment potential. Policy design should, however, reflect an awareness of the potential anticompetitive outcomes of provider-sponsored PPOs and should promote antitrust oversight of their activities.
尽管第三方赞助的首选供应商组织（PPO）可能会通过增强竞争为社会带来益处，但供应商赞助的PPO可能会产生反竞争勾结的风险。这种类似卡特尔的勾结可能导致价格固定、不那么积极的使用审查以及对市场准入和创新的限制。在本文中，我们针对供应商赞助的PPO带来的潜在风险提供指导。我们建议，公共政策总体上应促进PPO的发展，并消除阻碍其增长的监管障碍，因为它们具有控制成本的潜力。然而，政策设计应认识到供应商赞助的PPO可能产生的反竞争后果，并应加强对其活动的反垄断监督。
