Daskal Steven
Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 2018;28(1):23-48. doi: 10.1353/ken.2018.0001.
This paper demonstrates that acceptance of voluntary euthanasia does not generate commitment to either non-voluntary euthanasia or euthanasia on request. This is accomplished through analysis of John Keown's and David Jones's slippery slope arguments, and rejection of their view that voluntary euthanasia requires physicians to judge patients as better off dead. Instead, voluntary euthanasia merely requires physicians to judge patients as within boundaries of appropriate deference. This paper develops two ways of understanding and defending voluntary euthanasia on this model, one focused on the independent value of patients' autonomy and the other on the evidence of well-being provided by patients' requests. Both avoid the purported slippery slopes and both are independently supported by an analogy to uncontroversial elements of medical practice. Moreover, the proposed analyses of voluntary euthanasia suggest parameters for the design of euthanasia legislation, both supporting and challenging elements of existing laws in Oregon and the Netherlands.
本文表明,接受自愿安乐死并不会导致对非自愿安乐死或应要求安乐死的认同。这是通过分析约翰·基翁(John Keown)和大卫·琼斯(David Jones)的滑坡论证,并驳斥他们认为自愿安乐死要求医生判定患者死了会更好的观点来实现的。相反,自愿安乐死仅要求医生判定患者处于适当尊重的界限之内。本文基于此模型提出了两种理解和捍卫自愿安乐死的方式,一种侧重于患者自主性的独立价值,另一种侧重于患者请求所提供的幸福证据。两者都避免了所谓的滑坡,并且都通过与医疗实践中无争议的要素进行类比而得到独立支持。此外,对自愿安乐死的提议分析为安乐死立法的设计提出了参数,既支持又挑战了俄勒冈州和荷兰现有法律的要素。