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在不确定声誉环境下的动态网络合作。

Cooperation on dynamic networks within an uncertain reputation environment.

机构信息

Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, E-28911, Leganés, Madrid, Spain.

Unidad Mixta de Comportamiento y Complejidad Social UC3M-UV-UZ (UMICCS), Madrid, Spain.

出版信息

Sci Rep. 2018 Jun 14;8(1):9093. doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-27544-5.

DOI:10.1038/s41598-018-27544-5
PMID:29904185
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6002415/
Abstract

Reputation plays a key role among the mechanisms supporting cooperation in our society. This is a well-known observation and, in fact, several studies have shown that reputation may substantially increase cooperation among subjects playing Prisoner's Dilemma games in the laboratory. Unfortunately, recent experiments indicate that when reputation can be faked cooperation can still be maintained at the expense of honest subjects who are deceived by the dishonest ones. As experimental work is limited due to financial and other reasons, we present here an agent-based simulation model inspired by, and calibrated against, the results obtained in the experiment. We thus simulate much larger population sizes over longer times, and test other model parameters to see whether the observed behavior generalizes in those yet untried conditions. The results show that the collective behavior is qualitatively similar in larger systems and stable over longer times horizons. We conclude that the findings of the experimental work are meaningful, taking into account that the model is strictly tailored to our particular experimental setting and therefore it is a possible explanation of our observations whose applicability to other contexts requires further research. We argue that simulations like the ones presented here may also be useful to cheaply and quickly suggest settings and options to enhance and facilitate further experiments, which, in turn, may provide new tests of the models themselves.

摘要

声誉在支撑我们社会合作的机制中起着关键作用。这是一个众所周知的观察结果,事实上,有几项研究表明,声誉可以大大增加实验室中玩囚徒困境游戏的主体之间的合作。不幸的是,最近的实验表明,当声誉可以被伪造时,合作仍然可以以被不诚实的主体欺骗的诚实主体为代价维持。由于实验工作受到财务和其他原因的限制,我们在这里提出了一个基于代理的模拟模型,该模型受到实验结果的启发和校准。因此,我们在更长的时间内模拟更大的人群规模,并测试其他模型参数,以观察观察到的行为是否在那些未经尝试的条件下普遍存在。结果表明,在更大的系统中,集体行为在质上是相似的,并且在更长的时间范围内是稳定的。我们得出结论,考虑到该模型是严格针对我们特定的实验设置定制的,因此实验工作的发现是有意义的,这可能是对我们观察结果的一种解释,其在其他背景下的适用性需要进一步研究。我们认为,像这里提出的模拟也可能有助于廉价和快速地建议设置和选项,以增强和促进进一步的实验,这反过来又可以为模型本身提供新的测试。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/819e3c1447a9/41598_2018_27544_Fig7_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/d5c784158d11/41598_2018_27544_Fig1_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/e52fe6bb33b9/41598_2018_27544_Fig2_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/c4815f191550/41598_2018_27544_Fig3_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/82ff5d11402e/41598_2018_27544_Fig4_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/e76aadaf2869/41598_2018_27544_Fig5_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/402bb7be5129/41598_2018_27544_Fig6_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/819e3c1447a9/41598_2018_27544_Fig7_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/d5c784158d11/41598_2018_27544_Fig1_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/e52fe6bb33b9/41598_2018_27544_Fig2_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/c4815f191550/41598_2018_27544_Fig3_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/82ff5d11402e/41598_2018_27544_Fig4_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/e76aadaf2869/41598_2018_27544_Fig5_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/402bb7be5129/41598_2018_27544_Fig6_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3d77/6002415/819e3c1447a9/41598_2018_27544_Fig7_HTML.jpg

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本文引用的文献

1
Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation.在声誉不可靠的动态网络结构中,合作得以存续,作弊也有回报。
Sci Rep. 2016 Jun 2;6:27160. doi: 10.1038/srep27160.
2
Stability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactions.群体互动中基于形象评分的合作稳定性。
Sci Rep. 2015 Jul 15;5:12145. doi: 10.1038/srep12145.
3
The effects of reputational and social knowledge on cooperation.声誉和社会知识对合作的影响。
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2015 Mar 24;112(12):3647-52. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1415883112. Epub 2015 Mar 9.
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Reputation drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups.声誉推动人类群体中的合作行为和网络形成。
Sci Rep. 2015 Jan 19;5:7843. doi: 10.1038/srep07843.
5
Know thy neighbor: costly information can hurt cooperation in dynamic networks.了解你的邻居:昂贵的信息会损害动态网络中的合作。
PLoS One. 2014 Oct 30;9(10):e110788. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0110788. eCollection 2014.
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A comparative analysis of spatial Prisoner's Dilemma experiments: conditional cooperation and payoff irrelevance.空间囚徒困境实验的比较分析:条件合作与收益无关性
Sci Rep. 2014 Apr 11;4:4615. doi: 10.1038/srep04615.
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Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review.结构种群中群体相互作用的进化动态:综述。
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Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updating.合作和动态伙伴更新的关联。
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The value of reputation.声誉的价值。
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Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans.动态社交网络促进了人类实验中的合作。
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