Lynch Kate E, Morandini James S, Dar-Nimrod Ilan, Griffiths Paul E
Department of Philosophy and Charles Perkins Centre, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia.
Department of Biological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, 2109, Australia.
Behav Genet. 2019 Mar;49(2):221-234. doi: 10.1007/s10519-018-9909-z. Epub 2018 Jun 19.
When explaining the causes of human behavior, genes are often given a special status. They are thought to relate to an intrinsic human 'essence', and essentialist biases have been shown to skew the way in which causation is assessed. Causal reasoning in general is subject to other pre-existing biases, including beliefs about normativity and morality. In this synthesis we show how factors which influence causal reasoning can be mapped to a framework of genetic essentialism, which reveals both the shared and unique factors underpinning biases in causal reasoning and genetic essentialism. This comparison identifies overlooked areas of research which could provide fruitful investigation, such as whether normative assessments of behaviors influence the way that genetic causes are ascribed or endorsed. We also outline the importance of distinguishing reasoning processes regarding genetic causal influences on one's self versus others, as different cognitive processes and biases are likely to be at play.
在解释人类行为的原因时，基因常常被赋予特殊地位。人们认为基因与人类内在的“本质”相关，并且本质主义偏见已被证明会扭曲因果关系的评估方式。一般来说，因果推理会受到其他先存的偏见影响，包括关于规范性和道德性的信念。在本综述中，我们展示了如何将影响因果推理的因素映射到基因本质主义框架中，这揭示了因果推理和基因本质主义中偏见背后的共同因素和独特因素。这种比较确定了一些被忽视的研究领域，这些领域可能会带来富有成果的调查，比如对行为的规范性评估是否会影响基因原因的归因或认可方式。我们还概述了区分关于基因对自身与他人因果影响的推理过程的重要性，因为可能涉及不同的认知过程和偏见。
